Lovell v. State11/12/1997
deration for the death penalty anyone under the age of eighteen at the time the murder was committed. Art. 27, ยง 412(g). Thus, defense counsel submitted, the jury should also be told that "youthful age" applied only to persons eighteen and older. The trial judge expressed the view that that might confuse the jury and rejected that suggestion. The defense excepted. Thereupon, when the jurors were brought back to the courtroom, the court stated:
"Mr. Foreman, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we have received your note which says, 'Section III, Number 5, uses the term "youthful age". The jury wants to know if there is any further definition for this term or guidance the Court can give the jury relative to this term.' Answer to both of your questions is 'No.' There is no further definition to the term and there is no further guidance that the Court can give the jury relative to the term. Having completely answered your question, Mr. Foreman, you and the jury are excused to return to your jury room to continue your deliberations."
(Emphasis added). At 9:32 p.m. the jury returned a sentence of death finding, inter alia, that the mitigating factor of youthful age did not apply.
Youthful age has been listed as a potential mitigating circumstance since the enactment of a channelized-discretion, capital punishment statute by Chapter 3 of the Acts of 1978. At that time the statute contained no prohibition against capital punishment based on a fixed minimum age of the murderer at the time of the crime. In Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 473 A.2d 903, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900, 105 S. Ct. 276, 83 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1984), we said flatly "that the mitigating circumstance of youthful age is not measured solely by chronological age." Id. at 367, 473 A.2d at 921. We pointed out that in enacting the 1978 statute the General Assembly rejected an amendment that would have established a minimum age of eighteen at the time of the murder for imposition of the death penalty and also an amendment that would have defined "youthful age" to be twenty-five years or younger. Id. at 367 n.9, 473 A.2d at 921 n.9. We also quoted with approval from Neal v. State, 261 Ark. 336, 548 S.W.2d 135, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878, 98 S. Ct. 231, 54 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1977), to the effect that "'youth,' in its ordinary meaning, 'is equated with juvenility and adolescence; it seems to reach its outer limits at maturity.'" Stebbing, 299 Md. at 368, 473 A.2d at 921 (quoting Neal, 548 S.W.2d at 139). In Stebbing we held that the sentencing judge was not compelled to find the mitigating circumstance of youthful age, under all of the circumstances, where the defendant was nineteen years of age at the time of the murder. 299 Md. at 368-69, 473 A.2d at 922.
White v. State, 300 Md. 719, 481 A.2d 201 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S. Ct. 1779, 84 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1985), summarized the circumstances considered in Stebbing as "prior criminal conduct, home environment, marital status, degree of maturity, and alcohol and drug abuse, among others." Id. at 738, 481 A.2d at 210. In White we rejected the contention that no rational jury could have failed to find youthful age as a mitigating factor, where the defendant was age eighteen at the time of the murder. Id. at 739, 481 A.2d at 211.
In Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 478 A.2d 1143 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 105 S. Ct. 1231, 84 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1985), we held that the defendant's age at the time of the murder, seventeen years and eight months, did "not engage the Eighth Amendment as a shield to capital punishment." Id. at 428, 478 A.2d at 1164. Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 495 A.2d 1 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S. Ct. 868, 88 L. Ed. 2d 907
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|