 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Lovell v. State11/12/1997
47 U.S. 921, 100 S. Ct. 3010, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1112 (1980), concluded that there was no occasion to consider a comparative analysis where the distinctive group comprised more than ten percent of the total population. Id. at 190. Accordingly, we reject the request to adopt a standard under which a comparative disparity in excess of -20% would establish the second Duren element. Further, resolution of these cases tends to generate comparisons of percentages (as this opinion illustrates). We see no benefit in requiring trial judges to double the comparisons in every case by supplementing an absolute disparity analysis with a comparative disparity analysis. Absolute disparity remains the standard. See Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 1145 n.1715 (1996) (" Duren and most of the circuits use the 'absolute disparity' test ....").
By declining to adopt comparative disparity as the standard, and by not requiring trial judges to look to comparative disparity as a supplemental approach in all cases, we do not foreclose circuit courts from supplementing absolute disparity with comparative disparity in cases involving a distinctive group comprising less than ten percent of the total population in the county, if the trial court believes that comparative disparity would be helpful in deciding whether the representation of the distinctive group is fair and reasonable. To the extent that Bailey v. State, 63 Md. App. 594, 493 A.2d 396 (1985), can be read as prohibiting a trial court from even considering that which it believes may be helpful, that reading of Bailey is disapproved.
Thus, the circuit court did not err in declining to consider comparative disparity here, where the distinctive group comprises 17.6% of the population.
Lovell has produced no direct evidence that the election officials in Talbot County have excluded African Americans from registering to vote, nor will we infer from the percentages developed by Lovell's expert that those officials have deprived African Americans in Talbot County of their civil rights. Lovell's approach in attempting to demonstrate systematic underrepresentation in jury pools in reality faults the voter registration list for failing ideally to mirror the percentage of African Americans in the county's total population. Indeed, Lovell admits that the difference is "caused by exclusive reliance on voter registration lists." Brief of Appellant at 63.
"Voter registration lists are frequently used in jury selection and the practice has been consistently sustained." 3 J.G. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused ยง 17:14, at 83-84 (2d ed. 1986). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed en banc the issue before us in an appeal from the District of Maryland. See United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205, 108 S. Ct. 2846, 101 L. Ed. 2d 883 (1988). After a thorough review of its own cases and other authorities, the Fourth Circuit said:
"The authorities cited, from practically every Circuit including our own, in many of which certiorari has consistently been denied by the Supreme Court, as well as the legislative intent expressed in the Jury Selection Act itself, as found by the courts, categorically establish that there is no violation of the jury cross-section requirement where there is merely underrepresentation of a cognizable class by reason of failure to register, when that right is fully open."
Id. at 1448. See also United States v. Ireland, 62 F.3d 227, 231-32 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lewis, 10 F.3d 1086, 1089-90 (4th Cir. 1993); Davis v. Warden, 867 F.2d 1003, 1015 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. O'Leary,
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|