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Lovell v. State11/12/1997
mpt to escape, and those incidents occurred approximately 10 years earlier. We assumed that the court was aware of them and took them into account when making its decision to allow Bowers to remain in leg irons.
At Bowers' request, the jury was asked on voir dire whether it would be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict because of the leg irons and whether it would draw any inference as to his character from his appearance in leg shackles. One juror responded affirmatively to the latter question and was excused.
We rejected Bowers' complaint that he was entitled, as a matter of due process, to appear without shackles, holding that (1) the judge had discretion in the matter and did not abuse that discretion, and (2) in any event, no prejudice had been shown. The latter ground was based on the voir dire. We said:
"In [cited cases] we have found voir dire adequate to screen out any prejudice caused by pretrial publicity in the area from which the jury was drawn. If adequate for that, it certainly should be adequate for selection of a jury untainted with prejudice because of a defendant's shackling. Only one juror indicated that shackling would influence him and that juror was excused."
Bowers, 306 Md. at 138-39, 507 A.2d at 1081.
The principal discussion in Bowers was on the matter of discretion. We noted the long tradition, rooted in English common law, of not having defendants shackled in court, largely because of the presumption of innocence that a defendant enjoys and the fear that shackling or other undue measures (such as requiring the defendant to appear in prison garb) "'may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process.'" Id. at 131, 507 A.2d at 1077 (quoting from Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1693, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 130 (1976)). Citing a plethora of Federal and State cases, we concluded that "the courts uniformly rely upon an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing the action of trial judges in the matter of restraints . . . ." Id. at 132, 507 A.2d at 1078. We quoted, in particular, from United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 615 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946, 91 S. Ct. 964, 28 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1971):
"It is [the trial judge] who is best equipped to decide the extent to which security measures should be adopted to prevent disruption of the trial, harm to those in the courtroom, escape of the accused, and the prevention of other crimes. [citations omitted.] As a discretionary matter, the [trial] judge's decision with regard to measures for security is subject to limited review to determine if it is abused."
Quoting further from Samuel and other cases, we noted that, although the judge may consider and rely on the views of those responsible for courtroom security -- the marshal or the sheriff -- it is the judge's discretion that, in the end, must be exercised; that discretion may not be delegated to the sheriff. Citing numerous cases, we pointed out that, under such a discretionary standard, "leg cuffs, shackling, or other restraints have been upheld," even trial settings. Bowers, supra, at 135, 507 A.2d at 1079.
In nearly all of those cases, we observed, the issue arose in the context of a determination of guilt or innocence, where the discretion accorded to the judge is limited by the presumption of innocence and the justified concern over the distracting effect of shackles or other restraints. Bowers, we pointed out, as Lovell in this case, was not in that position: "He stands in the position of a convicted felon brought before a trial court for sentencing. He thus is unlike the ordinary defendant who at trial stands clothed with a presumption of innoc
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