 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Lovell v. State11/12/1997
f [the other judge]."
We found no error. We began by confirming the view expressed in Bowers, that, although shackling a defendant at a guilt/innocence trial is inherently prejudicial because of the defendant's right to have that determination based solely on the evidence produced at trial, "when the presumption of innocence is lost as the result of a conviction, there is less risk of prejudice at the sentencing hearing." Id. at 409, 583 A.2d at 228. We added:
"Shackling a defendant during the guilt/innocence phase of trial is inherently prejudicial because it highlights the 'need to separate a defendant from the community at large . . . .' Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 569, 106 S. Ct. at 1346, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 534. This concern is not as great during the sentencing hearing. It is clear that the defendant will be separated from the community. The only issue is whether the defendant will receive the death penalty or life imprisonment. The defendant's guilt of first degree murder is established and the jury is less likely to be prejudiced by the defendant's appearance in leg irons.
The defendant 'stands in the position of a convicted felon brought before a trial court for sentencing. He thus is unlike the ordinary defendant who at trial stands clothed with a presumption of innocence.' Bowers at 132, 507 A.2d at 1078. Because of this, other state interests may outweigh any prejudice to the defendant. The most obvious is the State's interest in maintaining custody of a convicted murderer. Perhaps no other defendant appearing before the court has a greater incentive to attempt escape than a convicted murdered facing the possibility of being executed. His 'best' hope is a life sentence."
Id., 583 A.2d at 228-29 (emphasis added).
The "bottom line," so to speak, was balancing any essential State interest in requiring the defendant to wear leg irons against "an unacceptable risk of prejudice," that balance to be measured on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 410, 583 A.2d at 229. In examining that balance, we identified three essential State interests that may justify restraining a defendant: preventing the defendant's escape, protecting persons in the courtroom, and maintaining order in the courtroom, all three of which were clearly weighed by Judge Horne in the case now before us. In Hunt's case, based on the fact that he left the State after the murder, feigned an illness to consider the prospect of an escape, and was an institutional troublemaker, we found that the record showed Hunt to be "a significant escape risk." Id. at 410, 583 A.2d at 229. From that, we concluded that the court had not abused its discretion in determining that the need for some physical restraint outweighed any potential prejudice. We rejected Hunt's complaint that the record did not adequately reflect the basis for requiring leg irons, noting the judge's articulated awareness of Hunt's record of violent crime and anti-social personality, and we also rejected the argument that the judge had delegated his discretion to his colleague.
As guidance to the trial bench, we stated that, when considering extraordinary security measures, a trial judge should employ procedural protections to minimize the possibility of prejudice to the defendants -- procedures such as hearing argument on the issue outside the presence of the jury, affording the defendant an opportunity to rebut, and, "upon request, issuing cautionary instructions to the jury or polling the jurors to determine if they would be disposed against the defendant because of the security measures." Id. at 413, 583 A.2d at 230-31.
As indicated, those procedural protections were afforded to Lovell. A hearing lasting m
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|