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Lovell v. State11/12/1997
he performance of his duties" and that Lovell had committed the murder "in furtherance of an escape or an attempt to escape from or evade the lawful custody, arrest, or detention of or by an officer or guard of a correctional institution or by a law enforcement officer." Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 413(d)(1), (2). The jury had been instructed to find the existence of one statutorily listed mitigating factor, i.e., the absence of any previous conviction for a crime of violence. The jury unanimously found that there were no other mitigating factors, either among those statutorily listed, see Art. 27, § 413(g)(2) through (7), or otherwise, see Art. 27, § 413(g)(8). After the jury rendered its death sentence, the court imposed consecutive sentences for the remaining convictions totaling 110 years.
On this appeal Lovell raises issues concerning:
I. The voluntariness of his guilty plea;
II. His being required to appear before the jury with his hands and feet shackled;
III. The sufficiency of the evidence to support the § 413(d)(3) aggravating factor;
IV. The failure of the trial court to respond to the jury's inquiry concerning the mitigating factor of youthful age;
V. The exclusion of five venirepersons for cause; and
VI. The alleged lack of a fair cross-section in the venire.
Additional facts will be stated in the discussion of the respective issues.
I
Lovell seeks to have his guilty plea to first-degree murder stricken because the record does not reflect that it was made "with understanding of the nature of the charge." Maryland Rule 4-242(c). More specifically, Lovell contends that
"there is nothing on the record to indicate that appellant understood, when he pled guilty ... that he was admitting he murdered Trooper Plank with premeditation, deliberation, and wilfulness. ... The nature of the charge of first degree murder is that it differs from all other types of murder in the intent .... The requisite intent which the accused must possess at the time of a killing in order to be convicted of first degree murder is described by three words: wilful, deliberate, and premeditated."
Brief of Appellant at 16-17. Because there is a "fine and often difficult distinction between first degree murder and the intent-to-kill variety of second degree murder," Willey v. State, 328 Md. 126, 138, 613 A.2d 956, 961 (1992), Lovell concludes that "it is inconceivable that a typical defendant would understand, without clear explanation, the difference" between the two degrees of murder. Brief of Appellant at 17.
By a criminal information the State charged that Lovell "did feloniously, wilfully and of deliberately premeditated malice aforethought kill and murder Trooper E.A. Plank." That information was served on Lovell at the hospital on October 18, 1995. That same day Lovell signed an acknowledgment for a District Court Commissioner that he had read the charging document or had it read to him. The Commissioner certified that Lovell had read it.
Lovell's argument seems to be that the record should reflect that he was given an explanation or definition of the concepts of willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation, and, apparently in addition, that those elements of first-degree, premeditated murder were contrasted for him with the elements of murder in the second degree. It was settled, however, in State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 424 A.2d 349 (1981), involving the predecessor to Rule 4-242(c), that the required "understanding of the nature of the charge" is not a requirement "that the precise legal elements comprising the off
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
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