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SMITH v. S.C. DEPT. OF MENTAL HEALTH11/24/1997
ufficiently established that his inability to find employment was a result of his injury, reinstated the Commission's finding of temporary total disability. Id. at 631, 142 S.E.2d at 45. The Court, citing the predecessor to S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-190, then noted that the employer could be relieved of its payment obligation if it offered or procured a suitable job for the employee. Id. at 632, 142 S.E.2d at 46.
Contrary to Smith's argument, we do not believe that the passing reference in Coleman to the employer's ability to terminate payments by procuring a job for the claimant amounts to a holding that the only way an employer can terminate compensation payments is to procure a job for the employee. Moreover, even if, under prior versions of the Act and applicable regulations, the employer was required to procure employment for the employee before payments could be terminated, such a requirement does not exist under the current Act, in view of Regulation 67-507's valid authorization for the termination of payments when the claimant reaches maximum medical improvement.
III.
Smith also argues on appeal that he was deprived of his due process rights to a full hearing when the single commissioner stopped the hearing. Under the particular circumstances of this case, we agree.
After approximately two hours of testimony, the single commissioner refused to permit any further evidence to be presented by the attorneys. The commissioner indicated that much of the evidence already presented was irrelevant or immaterial, stating "I feel . . . sometimes during this proceeding that we missed the issue and perhaps we didn't come as close as when the relief troops were dropping food in Bosnia and Croatia." The commissioner then called Smith to the stand and questioned him about his injuries and his ability to work. The commissioner did not allow Smith's attorney or DMH's attorney to question Smith. While the commissioner did allow the parties to proffer, in written form, a summary of the evidence they would have elicited from their witnesses had the hearing continued, he stated that he would not consider the proffered testimony, but that it would be included in the record for appellate review.
Section 1-23-330 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that, in contested cases, " rrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. . . . Subject to these requirements, when a hearing will be expedited and the interests of the parties will not be prejudiced substantially, any part of the evidence may be received in written form." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-330 (1)(1986).
Clearly, section 1-23-330 gives the commissioner discretion to limit or exclude irrelevant testimony. To the extent that the evidence presented at the hearing was irrelevant, the proper course under section 1-23-330 would have been to cut off the testimony when it became irrelevant, but to allow the other witnesses to testify. If those witnesses began testifying about irrelevant matters, their testimony likewise could have been limited. In this case, however, the commissioner allowed what he believed to be irrelevant evidence to be presented, and then refused to allow the testimony of other witnesses with relevant information. While the commissioner allowed the parties to present written summaries of the excluded testimony, he refused to consider it. Clearly, this is not the procedure envisioned by section 1-23-330.
Moreover, contrary to DMH's argument, we cannot conclude that Smith was not prejudiced by the closing of the hearing. The single commissioner stated in his order that " hile I believe that Mr. Smith was honest concerning some of his complaints, I cannot overlook all of
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