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SMITH v. S.C. DEPT. OF MENTAL HEALTH11/24/1997
the objective medical evidence indicating a lack of objective findings to support all of
More importantly, allowing Smith's attorney to question him likely would have given the single commissioner and the Commission a different understanding of the type of work Smith was actually capable of performing after his injuries. Smith argued below and argues again on appeal that, given his intellectual limitations and the fact that his work history consists solely of manual labor, the impairment to his back rendered him totally and permanently disabled. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Rice Servs., Inc., 323 S.C. 113, 118, 473 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1996) ("Employees who because of a work-related injury can perform only limited tasks for which no reasonably stable market exists are considered totally disabled notwithstanding their nominal earning capacity."); Coleman, 245 S.C. at 628, 142 S.E.2d at 44 ("Disability in compensation cases is to be measured by loss of earning capacity. Total disability does not require complete helplessness. Inability to perform common labor is total disability for one who is not qualified by training or experience for any other employment."); Colvin v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 227 S.C. 465, 474-75, 88 S.E.2d 581, 585-86 (1955) (affirming a finding of total permanent disability in case where injury rendered employee incapable of performing manual labor, the only labor for which the employee was qualified). This position was supported by the testimony of Smith's vocational rehabilitation counselor, who stated that, given Smith's "background and all of his liabilities and no more skills than he has I don't think there is any other employer [other than DMH] that's going to hire him. But that's not to say that he can't occasionally do some
The single commissioner, however, rejected this argument, noting Smith testified that he "could supervise a crew to do the type of work he did with the proper training, and the work that he knows how to do is building maintenance and plumbing." The single commissioner specifically rejected the evidence indicating that Smith was educable or mentally retarded, noting that Smith "did not have any problems understanding [the commissioner's] questions" and that "Mr. Smith's responses were forthright, intelligent, honest, and articulate."
Certainly, there is evidence in the record establishing that Smith is functioning at a higher level than that indicated by his high school records. However, there is also evidence that Smith believes he can function at a level higher than his actual performance and work history indicate. Had his attorney been able to elicit testimony from Smith, this difference in Smith's estimation of his abilities and his actual abilities would have been more apparent.
Administrative agencies are required to meet minimum standards of due process. S.C. Const. art. 1, § 3; Stono River Env. Protection Ass'n v. South Carolina Dep't of Health & Env. Control, 305 S.C. 90, 406 S.E.2d 340 (1990). In cases where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process at least requires an opportunity to present favorable witnesses. See, e.g., Brown v. South Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 301 S.C. 326, 391 S.E.2d 866 (1990); Tall Tower, Inc. v. South Carolina Procurement Review Panel, 294 S.C. 225, 363 S.E.2d 683 (1987). Accordingly, we conclude that the single commissioner improperly excluded testimony necessary for the Commission to make an informed decision, thus depriving Smith of his right to a full and fair hearing. See S.C. Const., art. 1, § 22 ("No person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi-judicial decision of an administrative agency affecting private rights except on due notice and an opportunity to be heard.") (emp
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