Meyer v. Walls9/5/1997
1937).
In the case before us, an examination of the complaint reveals that as well as stating in the caption and allegations that Underwood, Barrow, and Miller were being sued in their official and individual capacities, plaintiff was seeking damages from all defendants, including Underwood, Barrow, Miller, and their employer, Buncombe County DSS. Therefore, the complaint seeks recovery from Underwood, Barrow, and Miller in both their official and individual capacities.
Next, we must look at the official-capacity claims separately from the individual-capacity claims. A claim against Underwood, Barrow, and Miller in their official capacities is a claim against DSS and is subject to the same jurisdictional rulings as the suit against DSS. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the claims against Underwood, Barrow, and Miller in their official capacities are properly before the Superior Court along with the claim against DSS, and as to this aspect of plaintiff's claim, the trial court erred.
We turn now to a determination of whether the trial court properly dismissed the claims against Underwood, Barrow, and Miller in their individual capacities for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Our standard of review is "whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory." Harris v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of N.C., 85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987). In ruling upon such a motion, the complaint is to be liberally construed, and the trial court should not dismiss the complaint "unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Dixon v. Stuart, 85 N.C. App. 338, 340, 354 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1987).
Our determination depends partly on whether these defendants are public officials or public employees. Public officials cannot be held individually liable for damages caused by mere negligence in the performance of their governmental or discretionary duties; public employees can. See, e.g., Harwood v. Johnson, 326 N.C. 231, 241, 388 S.E.2d 439, 445 (1990); Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 331, 222 S.E.2d 412, 430 (1976); Givens v. Sellars, 273 N.C. at 49, 159 S.E.2d at 534; Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. at 7, 68 S.E.2d at 787; Hansley v. Tilton, 234 N.C. at 8, 65 S.E.2d at 303; Miller v. Jones, 224 N.C. at 787, 32 S.E.2d at 597.
It is settled law in this jurisdiction that a public official, engaged in the performance of governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, may not be held personally liable for mere negligence in respect thereto. The rule in such cases is that an official may not be held liable unless it be alleged and proved that his act, or failure to act, was corrupt or malicious, or that he acted outside of and beyond the scope of his duties. And, while an employee of an agency of government, as distinguished from a public official, is generally held individually liable for negligence in the performance of his duties, nevertheless such negligence may not be imputed to the employer on the principle of respondeat superior, when such employer is clothed with governmental immunity.
Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. at 7, 68 S.E.2d at 787 (citations omitted). "As long as a public officer lawfully exercises the judgment and discretion with which he is invested by virtue of his office, keeps within the scope of his official authority, and acts without malice or corruption, he is protected from liability." Smith v. State, 289 N.C. at 331, 222 S.E.2d at 430 (citing Carpenter v. Atlanta & C.A.L. Ry. Co., 184 N.C. 400, 40
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