FACTS/PROCEDURAL POSTURE




On February 16, 1987, John Sept ("Deceased") was killed in a car wreck. Attorney Jerry Screen was hired March 11, 1987, by Cassaundra Green to pursue a  All parties subsequently entered into an agreement providing Minor and Leila S. Minus ("Minus"), Deceased's mother, would share equally as beneficiaries in a wrongful death action being pursued by Administrator. Screen and Respondent would "be chief counsel for the purpose of pursueing   the wrongful death claim." The Barnwell County Probate Court approved this agreement in a written order July 10, 1987.


A settlement of the  Screen received this $175,000 payment in his capacity as chief legal counsel. From this lump-sum payment, in November 1987 he paid $152,132 in attorneys' fees as follows: (1) $51,000 to Respondent; (2) $36,877 to the attorney acting as separate counsel for Minus and Administrator, see supra note 3; (3) $5,000 to another attorney peripherally involved in the case; and (4) $59,255 to himself.




On April 3, 1991, Cassaundra Green and Minor filed a petition in Bamberg County seeking an accounting of how Screen distributed the $175,000 lump-sum payment because Minor had never received any portion of it. What followed was a confusing mass of legal actions and hearings, the substance of which is irrelevant to this disciplinary proceeding. Ultimately, all actions were consolidated into one for declaratory judgment in which the parties sought to have their rights and liabilities determined regarding the appropriate attorneys' fees arising from the wrongful death settlement. This declaratory judgment action was submitted to arbitration. After the


The complaint charged Respondent with collecting an excessive fee and engaging in conduct prejudicial to and tending to pollute the administration of justice. See DR 1-1-2 (5); DR 2-106;   5 (D), Rule 413, SCACR. Both the hearing panel and the Interim Review Committee ("IRC") found the allegations contained in the complaint constituted misconduct. Both recommended Respondent receive a public reprimand.




DISCUSSION




Under former DR 2-106 (A), a lawyer could not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or "clearly excessive fee." "A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." Id. at 2-106 (B).




Two documents are in the record which shed some light on the fee arrangements in this case. The first is between Cassaundra Green and Screen dated March 11, 1987. It provides Screen would be entitled to one-third of any recovery made. The second is a letter written July 2, 1987 from Screen to the attorney serving as separate counsel for Minus


  This will confirm our agreement of June 30, 1987, in
  which we agreed to proceed in the following manner:



  (a) That one-third (1/3) attorneys' fees for LaVaun
  Fox and myself on behalf of LaShawn Cartey Green will
  be taken off the top of the total settlement;



  (b) That we would agree to pay you the sum of
  $8,000.00 for your services and costs incurred up to
  and including June 30, 1987;



  (c) That hereafter LaVaun Fox and I would take over
  management of this case by serving as lead counsel.



Screen and Respondent testified when Respondent was associated to assist with the case, they agreed the two of them would equally split the one-third contingency fee.




The problem in this case centers around the manner in which Screen and Respondent valued the wrongful death settlement (more specifically, the annui

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