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SUAREZ v. DICKMONT PLASTICS CORPORATION2/18/1997
to remove the remaining plastic pellets in the feed chamber to avoid wasting material. On the day of the accident, the plaintiff claim that he had put his hand into the energized machine's feed chute while the machine was operating, thereby causing the plunger to move forward in the injection sleeve and partially amputat two of the plaintiff's right hand fingers." Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., supra, 229 Conn. 102-103.
It is clear that the defendant was playing Russian roulette with the plaintiff and its other employees merely to save production time and material. Because there was not a specific intent that the plaintiff's fingers would be cut off, the majority holds that intent was not satisfied. Nevertheless, in Mingachos, this court pointed out that " he intentional injury aspect may be satisfied if the resultant bodily harm was the direct and natural consequence of the intended act." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 102. The intention in this case may have been the saving of production time and materials, but the direct and natural consequence of that intention was the plaintiff's injury.
Notwithstanding the majority's narrow view of intent, the outrageous facts of this case require that we leave the determination of whether there was intent to the jury. See Gorra Realty, Inc. v. Jetmore, supra, 200 Conn. 164 (" uestions going to intent and motive, which require the drawing of inferences from proven facts, depend for their resolution upon an assessment of demeanor and credibility that is peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact"). Suarez recognized the need to protect workers in the real world, but the application of those principles in this case undermines that decision. Accordingly, I conclude that the jury reasonably could have inferred from Santiago's conduct, and from the circumstances leading to the plaintiff's injury , that Santiago actually intended to cause the plaintiff to injure himself.
B
Even if we assume, however, that the majority is correct, in my view, this matter should still be remanded for a new trial. As indicated in part I A of this dissent, our focus in determining intent must be on the consequences of the conduct in question. The majority concedes that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant knew that the consequences of its policies were substantially certain to produce an injury . The jury, in finding that the defendant intended the consequences — that is, the injury — logically also found that the defendant believed that the consequences were substantially certain to result from its policies with respect to cleaning the machines. Simply put, the defendant could not have intended the injury as found by the jury, without the jury also believing that the consequences were substantially certain to result under the majority's interpretation of the second interrogatory. The substantial certainty test is a subset of
the actual intent standard. For example, an employer cannot intentionally cause an injury to an employee by striking him with a pipe, without also knowing with substantial certainty that he would cause injury to the employee.
It is well settled that "intent is broader than a desire or purpose to bring about physical results. It extends not only to those consequences which are desired, but also to those which the actor believes are substantially certain to follow from what the actor does." W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 8, p. 35. "Thus, a specific intent to injure is not an essential element of an intentional tort where the actor proceeds despite a perceived threat of harm to others which is substantially certain, not merely likely, to occu
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