 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
SUAREZ v. DICKMONT PLASTICS CORPORATION2/18/1997
r." (Emphasis in original.) Jones v. VIP Development Co., 15 Ohio St.3d 90, 95, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984). "It may help to perceive `substantial certainty' not so much as a substantive test itself nor as a substitute for a subjective desire to injure, as a specie of evidence that will satisfy the [intent] requirement. . . ." Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 178, 501 A.2d 506 (1985). In other words, because the jury in this case found that the defendant actually intended to injure the plaintiff, which resulted in the plaintiff's injury, the jury logically was required to conclude that, as a result of requiring the plaintiff to clean the machine with his bare hands, the defendant believed that the plaintiff's injury would result with substantial certainty.
Therefore, the jury's answers to the special interrogatories finding that there was an actual intent to cause the injury that occurred and that the defendant did not know with substantial certainty that it would occur are inconsistent. "Where it is clear that the jury confused and that the verdict rendered is illogical and unreasonable in light of the instructions given . . . or the interrogatories addressed," the verdict cannot
stand. (Citations omitted.) Labatt v. Grunewald, 182 Conn. 236, 241-42, 438 A.2d 85 (1980). Furthermore, when a "verdict rests upon a factual finding contradictory to another finding of the same issue by the trier the judgment cannot stand." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Calabro v. Calabro, 33 Conn. App. 842, 847, 639 A.2d 1046 (1994). Under such circumstances, the verdict must be set aside and a new trial ordered.
I realize that this argument has not been advanced by the plaintiff. This, however, is one of those "truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings"; (internal quotation marks omitted) Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District, 235 Conn. 1, 25, 664 A.2d 719 (1995); and, therefore, constitutes plain error.
Justice requires that the plaintiff be granted a new trial. In Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 101, and Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., supra, 229 Conn. 108, this court recognized that intent includes not only the intent to cause the injury , but also that such injury was a substantial certainty to occur. The
actual intent standard without more, "`allows employers to injure and even kill employees and suffer only workers' compensation damages'"; Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., supra, 109; and allows an employer "`to "cost-out" an investment decision to kill workers.'" Id. Under the facts presented to us, however, that is exactly what happened here. The defendant, in order to avoid overtime, to have production for a full shift and to save on material, had an established policy that the plaintiff and other floormen were required to scoop out hot material from the machines by placing their bare hands in the machines while in operation, risking the amputation of their fingers. The majority allows the defendant, through its callous workplace policies, to "cost-out" the business decision to place employees at risk of serious injury . I therefore cannot agree with the majority's conclusion.
II
Because of its conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff's verdict under the actual intent standard, the majority declines to address the defendant's claim that the trial court should have rendered judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict because the defendant's liability is predicated on the actions of a foreman. I would conclude that, in
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Connecticut Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|