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SUAREZ v. DICKMONT PLASTICS CORPORATION2/18/1997
favorable to the prevailing party, the jury could reasonably have reached the verdict it did. The court finds the jury could
reasonably have reached this verdict. . . ." Additional facts will be provided as warranted.
I
The defendant first argues that, because the jury found for the defendant on interrogatories numbers one and three relating to the substantial certainty standard, the jury could not have rendered a verdict for the plaintiff because the actual intent standard had not been presented to the jury. We disagree.
We begin with the defendant's claim that the case was pleaded and tried solely upon the substantial certainty standard and, therefore, that the jury's negative answers to interrogatories numbers one and three contradict the general verdict in favor of the plaintiff. In response, the plaintiff asserts that both the actual intent and substantial certainty standards were before the jury, and that the jury's affirmative answer to interrogatory number two warrants the general verdict. We agree with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's third amended complaint alleged, in addition to allegations implicating the substantial certainty standard, that his injuries were caused by the "wilful, serious and intentional misconduct" of the defendant. Although these allegations were denied, the
defendant acknowledged in its memorandum submitted to the trial court that, with respect to these allegations, " he plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended to injure him or committed serious and wilful misconduct such that the defendant believed that the plaintiff's injury was substantially certain to follow from the defendant's conduct." (Emphasis added.)
Both parties submitted proposed jury instructions and special interrogatories to the trial court. With respect to the special interrogatories, the trial court adopted nearly verbatim the defendant's proposed draft special interrogatories, with the exception of the defendant's
proposed draft special interrogatory number one, which also addressed the actual intent standard. Although the parties had agreed to delete that proposed interrogatory, the trial court, adopting nearly verbatim the defendant's proposed jury instructions, instructed on both the actual intent and substantial certainty standards.
Not only did the trial court instruct on both standards in accordance with the defendant's own request to charge submitted to the trial court, but the defendant
failed to take an exception to the jury instruction on the actual intent standard as an alternative ground for finding liability. The defendant cannot now complain
when the trial court's jury instructions were based largely on the defendant's own proposed draft jury instructions. " n appellant should not be allowed to claim as error that which his own action has induced." Swerdloff v. AEG Design/Build, Inc., 209 Conn. 185, 191, 550 A.2d 306 (1988). Accordingly, the defendant's challenge relating to the jury instruction on the actual intent standard is deemed waived. Hughes v. Glastonbury, 19 Conn. App. 411, 412, 562 A.2d 591, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 815, 565 A.2d 535 (1989). Furthermore, the defendant's only exception with respect to the actual intent standard concerned the trial court's failure to provide examples of the two standards that the defendant had set forth in its proposed jury instructions.
Specifically, the defendant's counsel took exception to "the failure to include the examples with regard to intentional tort and substantial certainty. We would just like to take an exception to that. We believe that could further clarify this difficult charge."
The
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