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SUAREZ v. DICKMONT PLASTICS CORPORATION2/18/1997
njure himself in connection with the defendant's policies with respect to cleaning the machines. Indeed, our conclusion is consistent with the fact that the instruction preceding interrogatory number four regarding contributory fault required the jury to answer that interrogatory only if it "answered `yes' to any of the above questions," to which no exception was taken by the defendant. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, we do not read the interrogatories in isolation, but, rather, in conjunction with the jury instructions; Norrie v. Heil Co., supra, 203 Conn. 605; which in this case clearly set forth the actual intent standard. Accordingly, the defendant's argument that the jury's affirmative response to interrogatory number two, without affirmative responses to interrogatory number one or three, requires a defense verdict is unpersuasive.
II
The defendant next argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that the actions of Santiago may be attributed to the defendant under the doctrine of apparent authority to establish the defendant's liability for Santiago's intentional conduct. Specifically, the
defendant contends that, pursuant to long-standing case law, under the facts of this case attribution of corporate responsibility could only have been predicated on the theory of alter ego. The defendant further argues that there was insufficient evidence that Santiago was the defendant's alter ego, the trial court should have rendered judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict.
A
In its charge to the jury, the trial court instructed that the intentional actions of an employee could be attributed to the defendant if the employee had apparent authority to act on the defendant's behalf or was the alter ego of the defendant. Conversely, the defendant's
proposed jury instruction provided that the defendant could be liable for its employees' actions under only the actual authority and alter ego theories.
In Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215, 425 A.2d 1263 (1979), this court considered whether an employer could be subject to common-law tort liability for a battery that a supervisory employee committed upon a coemployee. This court noted that, as a general rule, " n intentional tort committed upon one employee by another, which causes personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, is covered by the compensatory provisions of the ." Id., 218. In Jett, however, the court carved out an exception to the rule: "If the assailant is of such rank in the corporation that he may
be deemed the alter ego of the corporation under the standards governing disregard of the corporate entity, then attribution of corporate responsibility for the actor's conduct is appropriate." Id., 219. Accordingly, the court concluded that " f the assailant can be identified as the alter ego of the corporation, or the corporation has directed or authorized the assault, then the corporation may be liable in common-law tort; if the assailant is only another employee who cannot be so identified, then the strict liability remedies provided by the are exclusive and cannot be supplemented with common-law damages." Id.
Despite the holding of Jett, the trial court in this case adopted the plaintiff's proposed instruction on apparent authority and charged the jury that " corporation, like any other employer, may be held liable for the acts or statements of its employees under either the alter ego theory or the apparent authority theory." The court instructed that "under the apparent authority theory, the employee's position and status in the corporation is irrelevant. To bind the corporation, any employee must merely have th
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