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Lascano v. Vowell9/5/1996
In this negligence action arising out of an automobile accident, plaintiff, Rebecca N. Lascano, appeals the portion of the judgment entered on a jury verdict against defendant, Gloria M. Vowell, which awarded her non-economic damages of $4,500. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages.
I.
Plaintiff first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in its timing in admitting into evidence a surveillance movie filmed by defendant shortly before trial. We agree.
Effective January 1995, C.R.C.P. 16(a) was repealed and re-adopted with substantial modifications. Because the trial in this case occurred before that time, the prior version of this rule (C.R.C.P. 16 (repealed)) governs this action.
At all times pertinent to this dispute, C.R.C.P. 16(a) (repealed) required that parties to a civil action must file disclosure certificates at least 90 days before trial. In these certificates, each party was required to include a description, attached copy, or photograph of any exhibit that he or she might offer at trial.
Litigants were permitted to supplement their disclosure certificates up to 80 days before trial to include information concerning exhibits or witnesses not known to them at the time the disclosure certificate was filed. C.R.C.P. 16(b) (repealed); see Consolidated Hardwoods, Inc. v. Alexander Concrete Construction, Inc., 811 P.2d 440 (Colo. App. 1991).
Moreover, under C.R.C.P. 16(c) (repealed), parties were bound by the information provided in their disclosure certificates. The trial court could allow the endorsement of exhibits later than 80 days before trial only as needed "to prevent manifest inJustice." In the event a party failed to comply with the requirements of this rule, the trial court was authorized to impose appropriate sanctions. See J.P. v. District Court, 873 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1994).
The purpose for requiring pretrial disclosure of witnesses and exhibits is to prevent undue surprise and to allow all parties an opportunity for adequate preparation. Thus, it was within the trial court's discretion to determine whether a violation of C.R.C.P. 16 (repealed) required the imposition of sanctions and, if so, the nature of the sanction to be imposed. Four Strong Winds, Inc. v. Lyngholm, 826 P.2d 414 (Colo. App. 1992).
C.R.C.P. 16 (repealed) was to be construed liberally so as not to deny a party the reasonable opportunity to present relevant evidence. However, in liberally construing this rule, the trial court had an obligation not to allow other parties to be prejudiced by the supplementation of witnesses or endorsements. Thus, a party's ability to supplement a disclosure certificate was not boundless. J.P. v. District Court, supra; see also Consolidated Hardwoods, Inc. v. Alexander Concrete Construction, Inc., supra.
Likewise, a trial court's discretion to permit late supplementation was limited, and a trial court abused its discretion if its decision was manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable. See People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987). Thus, the decision of the trial court should be reversed if its efforts to avoid prejudice and delay to one party substantially tipped the balance and thereby unreasonably denied the other party his or her day in court. J.P. v. District Court, supra.
So-called "surveillance movies" demonstrating a personal injury plaintiff's ability to carry on certain activities are di
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