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Dunlea v. Dappen9/19/1996
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
Plaintiff-appellant Sandra Dunlea appeals from the circuit court's: (1) July 27, 1993 order granting defendant-appellee Howard Dappen's motion to dismiss her claim of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) with prejudice on the basis that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; (2) February 9, 1994 order granting Dappen's motion for summary judgment with respect to Dunlea's claims of defamation and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (3) October 31, 1994 final judgment in favor of Dappen. Dunlea also appeals from certain of the circuit court's rulings regarding discovery matters.
For the reasons discussed below, we: (1) vacate the circuit court's order dismissing Dunlea's claim of CSA and remand this case for trial on the CSA claim; (2) affirm the order granting summary judgment in favor of Dappen on Dunlea's defamation and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Because we are remanding this case for trial, we also provide guidance with respect to the discovery matters.
I. BACKGROUND
Dunlea, who was born in 1947, alleges that she was the victim of incestuous rape at the hands of her natural father, Dappen. She has direct and detailed memory of sexual assaults that occurred between 1961 and 1964, when she was between the ages of fourteen and seventeen years old, while living with her father in Ventura, California. She also alleges memories, beginning at age five, of heinous assaults by a faceless attacker whom she now realizes was Dappen.
In 1964, Dunlea reported the incestuous rape to a California Highway Patrolman. After an investigation, she was removed from Dappen's custody and placed in a foster home. Dappen, apparently, was never prosecuted.
In 1991, Dappen told Dunlea's sister that he was still angry with Dunlea and would never forgive her for what happened in 1964. When the statement was repeated to Dunlea, it triggered a severe emotional reaction because Dunlea had interpreted her father's statement as blaming her for falsely accusing him of incest. One week later, she called Dappen at his Maui residence to confront him about the statement. Dappen was "very angry" and repeated to Dunlea that he would never forgive her for what she did to him. The conversation with Dappen prompted Dunlea to begin therapy.
Although Dunlea "has been haunted by depression, thoughts of suicide, shame, disgust, and denial," which have "greatly damaged every facet of life," it was only through therapy that she allegedly discovered that these feelings were symptomatic of a psychological illness caused by her father's incestuous rape.
On December 19, 1992, Dunlea filed a three-count complaint in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit. She alleged that: (1) the statement made by Dappen to Dunlea's sister was defamatory (count I); (2) the statements made by Dappen to Dunlea's sister and Dunlea directly constituted intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress (count II); and (3) she suffered damages as a result of CSA (count III). Relying on the California Code of Civil Procedure (Cal. C.C.P.) Section 340.1, Dunlea asserted in count III of her complaint that the substantive law of California should be applied because the incestuous rape occurred in California. Dunlea's prayer for relief sought "special, general, and punitive damages caused her, in an amount to be proven at trial[.]"
On January 22, 1993, Dappen timely filed his answer to the complaint, essentially denying, or claiming lack of sufficient information to admit or deny, each and every allegation of the complaint, except that he admitted the
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