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Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett8/28/1996
was "contaminated" but does not explain how or why, nor does OCF explain how the other unforeseen events during the trial caused it unfair prejudice. We find it extraordinary that OCF complains in one breath that the trial judge was ill for three weeks and asserts his illness as a foundation for mistrial, and in the next breath asks for a mistrial based on its own counsel's personal reasons for withdrawing from the case (the premature birth of his son). OCF's argument that the numerous unfortunate events which occurred during trial were unfairly prejudicial lacks merit entirely.
Nor are we remotely persuaded that the jury verdicts in favor of the cross-defendants are proof of unfair prejudice. As we discuss in the next section, from the facts presented during trial, a reasonable jury could easily have believed that the direct defendants were liable and the cross-defendants were not. Moreover, as we said earlier, this argument implicitly denigrates the jury by assuming that the few inflammatory remarks made about direct defendants would so cloud its judgment that jurors would render verdicts against the weight of the facts presented. We have no such suspicion that the jury would be so easily swayed by emotion that it would forsake its sworn duty, especially after four months' investment of time and energy.
B. Cross-Defendants' Liability
OCF and PH ask us to find that the jury verdicts in the Garrett, Scruggs, and Hohman cases in favor of all cross-defendants were "against the weight of the evidence." They contend that during closing arguments plaintiffs' counsel made "binding admissions" that sufficient evidence of liability against cross-defendants had been introduced. In addition, PH makes an extensive argument, adopted by OCF, that the verdict sheets were unfairly written so as to favor the cross-defendants and prejudice the direct defendants, and asks us to find that the trial judge abused his discretion by not granting PH's motion for a new trial on the cross-claims. Their arguments are not persuasive.
Our first order of business is to reiterate longstanding Maryland law that it is not the province of an appellate court to express an opinion regarding the weight of the evidence when reviewing judgment on a jury verdict. See Fowler v. Benton, 245 Md. 540, 545, 226 A.2d 556, 560 (1967) (judging weight of evidence is the province of the jury alone); Gray v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 245 Md. 80, 84, 224 A.2d 879, 881 (1966); Benkoe v. Plastic Assembled Prod., 231 Md. 419, 420, 190 A.2d 638, 639 (1963) ("When properly reserved, we pass upon the sufficiency of evidence to take a case to the jury, but we do not review the weight of the evidence after it has been passed upon by the jury"); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. State, 162 Md. 49, 56, 158 A. 45, 48 (1932); Stouffer v. Alford, 114 Md. 110, 116, 78 A. 387, 389 (1910); Fraidin v. Weitzman, 93 Md. App. 168, 193-94, 611 A.2d 1046, 1059 (1992), cert. denied, 329 Md. 109, 617 A.2d 1055 (1992). Even if a jury verdict is "inconsistent" in the sense that certain findings of fact cannot logically be reconciled with each other, we will normally not reverse a jury's verdict either in a civil or a criminal case. Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 594, 479 A.2d 1344, 1349 (1984); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 35-36, 578 A.2d 228, 240 (1994); Steffey v. State, 82 Md. App. 647, 662, 573 A.2d 70, 77 (1990).
Thus, almost as a matter of hornbook law, we reject defendants' argument regarding the weight of the evidence. We refuse to re-evaluate the evidence and invade the territory of the jury. The evidence against cross-defendants was sufficient to be submitted to the jury, and in any case obviously defenda
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