 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett8/28/1996
nts/appellants would not wish to make an argument of insufficiency. Beyond that, the jury and the jury only has the power to assess the weight of the evidence, a power which passes to the trial judge's discretion upon motion for a new trial. Weissman v. Hokamp, 171 Md. 197, 201, 188 A. 923, 925 (1937).
Lest we are suspected of merely misinterpreting defendants/appellants' apparent argument that we ought to re-weigh the evidence presented to the jury, we note that we thoroughly combed both sets of briefs (each defendant/appellant adopted the other's argument) and our transcript of oral argument to ensure that our reading was correct. Perhaps, for example, the phrase "against the weight of the evidence" was being used as a less than precise way of saying the trial judge abused his discretion in not granting a motion for a new trial on the cross-claims (as PH actually argues) rather than simply as a legal term of art. We quote the subheading from the OCF brief:
"THE JURY'S FAILURE TO FIND EVEN ONE CROSS-DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR CONTRIBUTION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE."
OCF went on to summarize (but in some detail) the evidence against the cross-defendants in each case, and argued in conclusion that the jury's failure to find even one cross-defendant liable "plainly was against the weight of the evidence, and requires entry of judgment in favor of Owens-Corning against these cross claim defendants, or alternatively, a remand for a new trial." OCF and PH "plainly" misunderstand basic appellate review of judgments on jury verdicts.
We also note that we are mystified by OCF's insistence that plaintiffs made "binding" admissions as to the liability of cross-defendants during argument. The plaintiffs' counsels could not "bind" the jury, nor parties whom they did not represent, to liability simply because they argued to the jury that they had introduced sufficient evidence to hold certain cross-defendants liable. OCF's position is illogical; the jury was clearly capable of disagreeing with the plaintiffs' assessment of the weight of the evidence in the case, and apparently did so.
OCF and PH allege two defects in the verdict sheets. First, liability of direct and cross-defendants was treated separately on the verdict sheets for each plaintiff's case; defendants argued that all defendants, regardless of party status, should be included in a single set of questions. Otherwise, according to defendants' theory, "the presentation may have confused the jury." As evidence that the party status distinctions on the verdict sheets did confuse the jury and result in "illogical" verdicts, PH points out that as a cross-claim defendant in the Harmon case (see footnote 1) OCF was not found liable, but was liable as a direct defendant in the Garrett, Scruggs, and Hohman cases.
Second, both defendants/appellants argue that the trial court also improperly combined the issues of "substantial factor causation" and "negligence" into one cross-defendant question, while asking the same two issues separately in two direct defendant questions. PH contends the combination of causation and negligence in one cross-defendant question "effectively eliminated the possibility of the jury answering with any specificity . . . created the impression that direct and cross-defendants may be treated differently."
The law governing "special verdicts" is found in Maryland Rule 2-522 (c), which provides:
"Special Verdict. -- The court may require a jury to return a special verdict in the form of written findings upon specific issues. For that purpose, the court may use any method of submitting the issues and requiring written findings as it deems appr
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|