PREER v. MIMS
9/23/1996
In these consolidated medical malpractice actions, John Preer ("Preer") and Jacquelyn Preer ("Mrs. Preer") appeal the trial court's directed verdict in favor of Dr. Albert Mims. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Preer began seeing Dr. Mims in 1982. Some time later, Preer became acquainted with the prescription drug Vicodin when he took some of the drug his wife was using. The Vicodin relieved his abdominal cramps, so he requested that Mims prescribe the drug for him. In 1986 Mims began prescribing Vicodin for Preer and continued to do so until 1991. Preer's use of Vicodin increased in 1988. In April 1988, Mims prescribed Preer 15 Vicodin pills with two refills. At Preer's request, this was increased to 20 pills per month, and then to 30 pills with two refills per month. By May or June of 1988, he had developed a tolerance for the drug. Preer testified that from 1986 until 1991, he had some 70 office visits with Mims related to obtaining Vicodin prescriptions and was prescribed some 10,000 Vicodin pills over this period. Unbeknownst to Mims, Preer was also obtaining Vicodin from two other doctors beginning in 1990 or 1991.
By July 1988, Mims began advising Preer to use the drug sparingly. The record contains extensive evidence, in the form
On April 29, 1993, Preer brought this action alleging he had become addicted to the Vicodin as a result of Mims's negligence. Mrs. Preer also initiated an action, alleging loss of consortium. The cases were consolidated and went to trial. At the close of Preer's case, Mims moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The court granted the motion.
Preer appeals arguing the trial court erred in ascertaining the time for commencement of the action under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-545 (A) (Supp. 1995), the
LAW/ANALYSIS
A. Stature of Limitations
Preer contends that the trial court erred in interpreting S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-545 to bar this action and urges this Court to adopt the continuous treatment doctrine In interpreting the statute.
Under section 15-3-545 (A),
ny action . . . to recover damages for injury to
the person arising out of any medical, surgical, or
dental treatment, omission, or operation by any
licensed health care provider . . . acting within the
scope of his profession must be commenced within
three years from the date of the treatment, omission,
or operation giving rise to the cause of action or
three years from date of discovery or when it
reasonably ought to have been discovered, not to
exceed six years from date of occurrence, or as
tolled by this section.
When the treatment, omission, or operation consists of a single
Legislatures and courts have attempted to resolve this difficulty through the adoption of the continuous treatment doctrine. The doctrine has been defined In varying ways, but the following is one formulation cited by a number of courts:
The so-called "continuous treatment" rule as
generally formulated is that if the treatment by the
doctor is a continuing course and the patient's
illness, injury or condition is of such a nature as
to impose on the doctor a duty of continuing
treatment and care, the statute does not commence
running until treatment by the doctor for the
particular disease or condition involved has
terminated — unless during treatment the
patient learns or should learn of negligence, In
which case the statute runs from the time of
discovery, actual or constructive.
In this case, we need
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