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PREER v. MIMS9/23/1996 not decide whether to adopt the continuous treatment doctrine. If we chose to adopt it, the formulation of the doctrine would include a discovery exception, as has been recognized by many courts. See Anderson v. Short, ___ S.C. ___, ___, 476 S.E.2d 475 (1996). Because Preer falls under this discovery exception, the doctrine would be of no assistance to him; therefore, our adoption of the doctrine is unnecessary under the present facts.
The trial court ruled that Preer knew or reasonably ought to have discovered his cause of action as late as March 27, 1990. We agree. The record reveals that Preer, an educated and sophisticated individual, was well aware of his addiction to Vicodin by March 1990, as indicated by his own statements and by Mims's medical notes evidencing the counselling he was giving Preer. Because Preer had knowledge of his addiction, and, hence, knowledge of Mims's negligence, by March 1990, the statute of limitations began running at that time, and any action after March 1993 would be barred. Preer brought this action on April 29, 1993; accordingly, he is barred by the statute of limitations. See Wilson v. Shannon, 299 S.C. 512, 386 S.E.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1989) (Facts actually known by plaintiff were sufficient to put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that doctor had improperly prescribed Valium.).
B. Loss of Consortium
Mrs. Preer has also appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the limitations period of her husband's
Under South Carolina law, unlike that of some other states, loss of consortium is an independent action, not derivative. See S.C. Code Ann. ยง 15-75-20 (1976)("Any person may maintain an action for damages arising from an intentional or tortious violation of the right to the companionship, aid, society and services of his or her spouse."); Hiott v. Contracting Servs., 276 S.C. 632, 281 S.E.2d 224 (1981)(where husband instituted a
Although loss of consortium is an independent action, case law has held that the right of action does not accrue until the loss of the services, society and companionship of the spouse has actually occurred, which has been defined as the point when the spouse sustained the injuries. See Berry v. Myrick, 260 S.C. 68, 194 S.E.2d 240 (1973). Under facts strikingly similar to those of the present case, Brown v. Finger, 240 S.C. 102, 124 S.E.2d 781 (1962) held
Because the trial court improperly determined that loss of consortium is a derivative action, it did not reach the question of when the action accrued, or when it was discovered or may have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Thus, we reverse this portion of the order and remand.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court is AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
FINNEY, C.J., MOORE, WALLER and BURNETT, JJ., concur.
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