 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Buckhannon v. U.S. West Communications Inc.3/21/1996
find that the fourth element required for application of collateral estoppel is lacking here. Buckhannon did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the possibility of bad faith on the part of U.S. West because that was not the issue before the arbitrator.
Hence, Buckhannon's claims for abuse of process and malicious prosecution are not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. U.S. West, nevertheless, contends that Buckhannon's claims are precluded because he "consented" to U.S. West bringing the motion for sanctions as part of his voluntary dismissal of the personal injury suit. In the stipulated motion for dismissal, the defendants reserved any issues relating to § 13-17-101 and C.R.C.P. 11 that might be presented to the court upon proper motion and pleading. However, this reservation was not enough to constitute a waiver on Buckhannon's part as to any future claim against U.S. West based on bad faith.
The trial court would have retained jurisdiction over a motion for sanctions by U.S. West even if the reservation had not been included in the dismissal, because such jurisdiction is incorporated by statute in § 13-17-101. Accordingly, including the reservation was not essential to U.S. West's later motion for sanctions; thus, there was nothing requiring Buckhannon's "consent." The presence of the clause in the dismissal has no effect on Buckhannon's current position that the sanctions were sought in bad faith.
IV.
Finally, citing Miller v. First National Bank of Englewood, 156 Colo. 358, 399 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1965), Buckhannon contends that the trial court erred in denying his request to conduct discovery prior to its grant of summary judgment. Further, citing Wolther v. Schaarschmidt, 738 P.2d 25 (Colo. App. 1986), Buckhannon also argues that because U.S. West committed intentional torts against him, he should have been allowed to discover the company's true intent in making the offending remarks to Monarch before his claims were dismissed. We conclude that, on remand, some discovery requests should be reconsidered.
Because U.S. West's remarks were protected by the absolute attorney privilege, the company's motivations for making them are irrelevant to Buckhannon's claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. See Western Technologies, Inc. v. Sverdrup & Parcel, Inc., supra. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Buckhannon's discovery request because discovery could not have produced any facts that would have precluded summary judgment on that claim. Sundheim v. Board of County Commissioners, 904 P.2d 1337 (Colo. App. 1995).
However, Buckhannon's claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process are based on U.S. West's attempts to have him sanctioned for bringing the personal injury suit. This U.S. West conduct is not protected by the absolute attorney privilege, and the company's intent is therefore a relevant, discoverable fact for these two intentional tort claims. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court must reconsider any discovery request by Buckhannon pertaining to these claims. See Wolther v. Schaarschmidt, supra.
The judgment is affirmed as to the dismissal of the intentional interference with contract claims, is reversed as to the dismissal of the malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings on these latter claims.
JUDGE PLANK and JUDGE NEY concur.
Disposition
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Colorado Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|