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Heiat v. Eastern Montana College3/4/1996
administrative decisions made by EMC.
In her deposition, Nafisseh confirmed that she had no knowledge that would create a genuine issue of material fact:
Q: So you don't think — you don't know then that the basis for offering you $28,000 was the fact that you were a woman rather than the fact that you were the second Ph.D. hired?
HEIAT: I know that I was offered a lower salary, and I knew that I was a female rather than a male compared to another colleague who was paid a higher salary. So my conclusion was that probably it was based on my sex.
Q: Well, you said that you can't say that the school was not basing their salary decisions on the fact that you were the second Ph.D.?
They might very well have been basing them on that?
HEIAT: I said I don't know. If they were, I wasn't aware of it. Nobody told me.
Nafisseh's subjective belief of discrimination does not create a genuine issue of material fact. See Tozzi v. Joliet Junior College (U.S.D.C.N.D. Ill. 1989), 57 FEP 269, 272, 1989 WL 96447 (citing Andre v. Bendix Corp. (7th Cir. 1988), 841 F.2d 172, 176, cert. denied (1988), 488 U.S. 855, 109 S.Ct. 144, 102 L.Ed.2d 116). Her statements are conclusory and are not supported by any specific evidence and are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound (Wash. 1988), 753 P.2d 517, 519-20.
The majority cites Box v. A & P Tea Co. (7th Cir. 1985), 772 F.2d 1372, and Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (10th Cir. 1984), 746 F.2d 1407, and yet both these cases support the traditional summary judgment standard.
It is true that once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the opposing party may not merely rest on the allegations in the complaint and must respond with some factual showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Brown, 746 F.2d at 1412.
As the district court correctly noted, ` onjecture, speculation, references to matters outside the [affiant's] personal knowledge, conclusory statements and bare assertions of the general truth of a particular matter will not suffice to withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment.'
Box, 772 F.2d at 1378.
In this case, Nafisseh has certainly not presented any evidence that EMC's proffered reasons are pretextual nor has she presented evidence that would raise an inference that the reasons are pretextual. She instead argues that she and her husband were not informed of EMC's reason for the pay differential when they were hired and, since her husband is being paid more, she "concluded" that she had been discriminated against based upon her gender. Under the McDonnell Douglas/Foster analysis, a plaintiff seeking to establish a pretext must, at a minimum, introduce evidence that raises an inference that the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual. Nafisseh has simply failed to do so.
This Court has held that the primary policy and general purpose underlying Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., is "to promptly dispose of actions in which there is no genuine issue of fact, thereby eliminating unnecessary trial, delay and expense." Silloway v. Jorgenson (1965), 146 Mont. 307, 310, 406 P.2d 167, 169. " he purpose of summary judgment is to encourage judicial economy by eliminating unnecessary trials. . . ." Cole v. Flathead County (1989), 236 Mont. 412, 416, 771 P.2d 97, 99-100.
he salutary purposes of summary judgment — avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials — apply no less to discrimination cases than to commercial or other areas of litigation. . . . To
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