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Heiat v. Eastern Montana College3/4/1996
allow a party to defeat a motion for summary judgment by offering purely conclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any concrete particulars, would necessitate a trial in all Title VII cases.
Ritzie v. City Univ. of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1989), 703 F. Supp. 271, 281.
Virtually all of the cases in this area, including those cited by the majority, require more than speculation and conclusory statements. Here EMC's proffered reason was that Abbas had been hired at the higher salary for an "anchor position" because of the need for a Ph.D. in the discipline. No evidence contradicted this. When Nafisseh was hired there was no need to expend additional dollars to recruit a Ph.D. since the discipline already had one. No evidence contradicted this. Nafisseh and the majority speculated that the "anchor position" might require additional duties. No evidence supports this speculation. Nafisseh has simply failed to establish evidence which would support an inference that EMC's reasons were pretextual.
The proper standard was set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Foster and was properly articulated and applied by this Court in Kenyon. I would continue to rely on the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine standard as defined in the summary judgment context by Foster and adopted by this Court in Kenyon. However, under either standard Nafisseh has failed to establish that EMC's proffered reasons are pretextual. I would affirm the District Court.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
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