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Heiat v. Eastern Montana College3/4/1996
he summary judgment context. The plaintiff must allege a prima facie case of discrimination in her complaint. In this context, the plaintiff alleges a prima facie case by asserting that plaintiff is a member of a protected class, and that a male colleague with the same credentials, who performs substantially the same work, receives a higher salary. The employer seeking summary judgment must then come forward with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the disparity. If the employer comes forward with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must then, in addition to having alleged a prima facie case in the complaint, produce evidence that establishes her prima facie case as well as evidence which raises an inference that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual.
Of course, this does not mean that a plaintiff in a discrimination action always survives summary judgment when the plaintiff calls the employer's proffered explanation into question. Rather than having to demonstrate with specific facts that the employer's explanation "is a pretext," she need only introduce evidence which raises an inference that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual. To create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext, the plaintiff must not only introduce evidence from which a reasonable person could infer that she is qualified, she must also introduce evidence that casts doubt on the defendant's contention that there was a legitimate business justification for defendant's action. Chauhan v. M. Alfieri Co. (3d Cir. 1990), 897 F.2d 123, 127 (citing Healey v. New York Life Ins. Co. (3d Cir. 1988), 860 F.2d 1209, 1220, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1098, 109 S.Ct. 2449, 104 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1989)).
The Chauhan court determined that the plaintiff had pointed to evidence necessary to pass this test, stating that "the inconsistencies in [defendant's] explanation, as pointed out by [plaintiff], present precisely the kind of `inconsistencies and implausibilities in [defendant's] proffered reasons' that could support an inference of discrimination." Chauhan, 897 F.2d at 128 (citations omitted).
Justice Nelson's specially concurring opinion contends that the Kenyon test requires that a plaintiff opposing summary judgment do nothing more than establish a genuine issue of material fact. However, as this case exemplifies, in discrimination cases, the district courts are requiring that a plaintiff do more than merely raise an issue of material fact. In the present case, the District Court held that EMC established a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the salary disparity and that:
Dr. Nafisseh Heiat failed to establish the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by EMC for her salary is pretextual. A reasonable jury could not return a verdict in favor of Dr. Nafisseh Heiat in light of the evidence presented to the court during the summary judgment proceedings. [Emphasis added.]
Notably, the court granted summary judgment not because of Nafisseh's inability to establish a genuine issue of material fact or to raise an inference of pretext. Rather, the court, citing the McDonnell Douglas trial burden, faulted Nafisseh for her failure to "establish" that EMC's proffered reason "is a pretext."
The test that we now establish for a plaintiff in a discrimination case to survive a motion for summary judgment comports with Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., in that a plaintiff is required to raise an inference of pretext, as opposed to proving pretext. This burden is more aligned with the general requirement of raising a genuine issue of material fact to survive the motion for summary judgment.
In the instant case, Nafis
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