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BLYTH v. MARCUS3/18/1996
The question presented is whether S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-30 (1976) survived the adoption of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules). The trial judge dismissed the negligence action filed by Eileen C. Blyth, finding Rule 3(b), SCRCP impliedly repealed section 15-3-30, thus Blyth's action was barred by the statute of limitations. Blyth appeals.
FACTS
On August 20, 1984, Blyth was injured after Frank Marcus allegedly struck her with his auto while she was riding her bicycle in Columbia. At the time, both parties were residents of South Carolina. Blyth filed an action on August 28, 1984, which was later dismissed without prejudice in February, 1985. Approximately one year after the accident Marcus moved out of state and has since resided in Georgia.
Blyth filed this action on August 15, 1991. Marcus's counsel received a copy at that time. However, Blyth's attempted mail service to Marcus failed, and Marcus was personally served on September 19, 1991 by a Georgia county sheriff, and again on January 11, 1993 by the Executive Director of the S.C. Department of Highways and Public Transportation.
DISCUSSION
A statute of limitations reduces the interval between the accrual and commencement of a right of action to a fixed period, thereby putting to rest claims after the passage of time. See 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitations on Actions § 15 (1970); Nowlin v. General Tel. Co., 310 S.C. 183, 186, 426 S.E.2d 114, 116 (Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, 314 S.C. 352, 444 S.E.2d 508 (1994). This procedural device operates as a defense to limit the remedy available from an existing cause of action. Langley v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401, 438 S.E.2d 242 (1993)(citing Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 511 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 108 S.Ct. 2871, 101 L.Ed.2d 906 (1988)). Unless an action is commenced before expiration of the limitations period, the plaintiff's claim is normally barred. See, e.g., McLain v. Ingram, 314 S.C. 359, 444 S.E.2d 512 (1994). Blyth's action was limited by S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530 (5)(Supp. 1995)(six year period on tort causes of action arising prior to April 5, 1988), the applicable statute of limitations. The normal expiration of the statute of limitations on
The trial judge accepted Marcus's three-fold argument that Rule 3(b) impliedly repealed section 15-3-30. Marcus argues: (1) the Legislature specifically provided in 1985 S.C. Act No. 100 (South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure legislation, hereinafter 1985 Act) for the repeal of remaining procedural statutes which conflicted with the Rules; (2) legislative intent prevails over statutory rules, as the case here, where the Legislature's purpose behind the 1985 Act in embracing an entire subject matter (tolling procedure in civil suits) repealed existing law of the same subject matter; and (3) the general language of Rule 1, SCRCP (the Rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action), public policy concerns, and simplified and additional service of process options now available to plaintiffs, all foreclose the need for `protectionist' and `obsolete' legislation such as section 15-3-30.
Blyth argues because particular code sections were repealed by the 1985 Act, see, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-10 (1976 & Supp. 1995), the legislature would have repealed section 15-3-30 had it intended the Rules to replace it. Blyth also argues South Carolina Supreme Court decisions after the enactment of the Rules demonstrate the continued vitality of section 15-3-30.
Under Section 3 of the 1985 Act, the Legislature provided that in the event of conflict, the Rules replace existing procedural statutes. Howeve
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