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BLYTH v. MARCUS3/18/1996
5, 435 S.E.2d 847, 850 (1993).
Marcus's second argument, that by embracing an entire subject of revisions and codes the Legislature intended to repeal former acts of the same subject matter, is incorrect in this instance. While the Rules apply to procedural matters in civil cases generally, the Legislature has nevertheless retained interest in various procedural matters via its legislative enactments. This is especially true of statutes like the one at issue. The Legislature made it clear that regarding statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, and tolling statutes, it shall Thus, in view of the substantial Legislative activity in this area after the enactment of the Rules, it is difficult to accept the proposition that the Legislature would simply overlook section 15-3-30. Accord Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 282 S.C. 546, 320 S.E.2d 458 (Ct.App. 1984)(legislature's enumeration of particular exceptions in a statute gives rise to strong inference that no other exceptions were intended).
Marcus contends that policy concerns of avoiding delay in concluding civil disputes require repeal of section 15-3-30. We disagree. Marcus argues the reduced statutes of limitations for certain tort and contract causes of actions in recent years, alternative methods of placing cases on the jury roster, easing of service of process rules, and the general policies underlying the adoption of the Rules weigh in favor of repealing the `obsolete' and `protectionist' tolling provision of section 15-3-30. However, in addition to section 15-3-30, our Legislature has spoken with clarity in describing other fortuitous circumstances to toll applicable statutes of limitations, including certain categories of plaintiffs (S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-40 (Supp. 1995) (disability)), one category of plaintiffs or defendants (S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-80 (1976) (suits by and against enemy aliens)), certain other proceedings (S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-100 (1976) (effect of stay of action by injunction or statutory provision)), and types of plaintiffs in certain kinds of cases (S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-545(D) (Supp. 1995) (age of minority in medical malpractice actions)). Because of the Legislature's consistency and specificity in providing for statutory tolling exceptions, particularly like the one at issue which operates to postpone commencement requirements, we cannot conclude the Legislature overlooked these arguments. See Holman v. Bulldog Trucking Co., 311 S.C. 341, 348, 428 S.E.2d 889, 893 (Ct.App. 1993)("When the Legislature has enacted a rule embodying a particular policy choice, the courts have no power to annul the Legislature's judgment by substitution of their own views of sound public policy.")
Blyth failed to commence this action before the six-year statute of limitations period was normally due to expire. However, because Marcus left South Carolina within one year of the accident, and he has been residing outside the state since, section 15-3-30 applied to toll the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Harris v. Dunlap, 285 S.C. 226, 328 S.E.2d 908 (1985); Cutino v. Ramsey, 285 S.C. 74, 328 S.E.2d 72 (1985). Moreover, Marcus has failed to raise any countervailing statutory provision which would preclude operation of section 15-3-30. See, e.g., Langley v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401, 438 S.E.2d 242 (1993)(
In light of this holding, we decline to address Blyth's remaining issue on appeal. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is
Reversed and remanded.
CURETON and GOOLSBY, JJ., concur.
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