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Yardman v. San Juan Downs Inc.8/23/1995
such benefits were derived from a collateral source and denied any offset.
41. We think it was error to deny an offset for the value of the benefits derived from the insurance policies provided by Defendants. Plaintiff has not shown, nor does he argue on appeal, that he paid any of the premiums for such policies or that the policies were procured and paid by any one other than Defendants. Instead, he argues the Jockeys Guild negotiated with the track for the County to obtain such coverage on behalf of jockeys who were injured at the track. The collateral source rule is designed to preclude an alleged tort-feasor from setting up in mitigation or reduction of damages that the plaintiff has been compensated by insurance in whole or in part, where such insurance was not procured by the alleged wrongdoer. ), cert. denied, 97 N.M. 140, 637 P.2d 571 (1981); see also ) (collateral source rule does not apply and defendant is entitled to offset where benefits are shown to derive from defendant or source identified with him).
42. Plaintiff also argues that even if this Court holds that the trial court erred in barring any offset under the collateral source rule and if the $300,000 cap on damages in Section 41-4-19 is constitutional, the $61,000 should be credited against the jury verdict of $400,000, and not credited against the reduced amount of $300,000. This issue need not be addressed because of our Disposition of the appeals herein.
7. Claim of Cumulative Error
43. Because we hold that the trial court erred in refusing Defendants' requested jury instruction on comparative negligence and the cause must be remanded for a new trial, we need not address Defendants' claim of cumulative error.
PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL
1. Request for Post-Judgment Interest
44. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for an award of post-judgment interest. He argues that because Section 41-4-19(B) of the Tort Claims Act, which imposes a limitation or cap on the amount of any damage award, does not specifically restrict post-judgment interest, allowance of such interest is authorized. We affirm the ruling of the trial court on this issue. A similar argument was addressed by this Court in ), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 602, 856 P.2d 250 (1993), where we held that an award of post-judgment interest on judgments against a governmental entity is not permitted under the Tort Claims Act. We conclude that the same result is also applicable here.
2. Meaning of "Single Occurrence"
45. Plaintiff claims he is entitled to a judgment in excess of $300,000 because there were two concurrent proximate causes or "occurrences" giving rise to his injuries. In furtherance of this argument, Plaintiff reasons that because there were two separate "occurrences" within the meaning of Section 41-4-19, this factor would result in doubling the $300,000 statutory limit imposed on damages awards under the Tort Claims Act.
46. He argues that in the present case the County's failure to replace its exposed gooseneck rail with a safer system was a proximate cause of his injuries. He also contends that the County's placement of the exit gap constituted a second separate proximate cause which contributed to his injuries.
47. We believe Plaintiff's argument was expressly answered by our Supreme Court in . In Folz the Court noted that, although the term "'single occurrence'" is not defined in the Tort Claims Act, where multiple negligent acts or omissions antedate the event giving rise to liability, the term "'single occurrence'" as used in the Act refers "to all harm that, although proximately caused by a particu
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