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St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Glassing12/20/1994
he payments required under its insurance contract, courts have held, generally, that such a contention was without merit. . . . he statute of limitations begins to run on such actions at the same time that the statute of limitations would have begun to run on the insured's action . . . against the third-party tortfeasor.
Annotation, "When Does Statute of Limitations Begin to Run upon Action by Subrogated Insurer Against Third-Party Tortfeasor," 91 ALR 3d 844, 850 ยง 3; See also, Beedie, 610 P.2d at 716; Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vargas (Ariz. App. 1988), 754 P.2d 346; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm (N.C. App. 1993), 426 S.E.2d 298.
Finally we note that St. Paul could have protected its subrogation interest. St. Paul could have intervened in the action filed by Lynn against Glassing. See, Dominici v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1964), 143 Mont. 406, 414, 390 P.2d 806, 810, (recognizing the right of the uninsured motorist insurer to intervene).
For the above stated reasons we hold that St. Paul's subrogation claim against Glassing was barred by the statute of limitations, and that the District Court erred in concluding that St. Paul was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we remand this case to the Eighth Judicial District Court for entry of an order granting summary judgment to Glassing.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE, JUSICES HARRISON, WEBER, GRAY, TRIEWEILER and HUNT concur.
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