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Kiss v. Jacob12/14/1994
ff if he makes a low settlement.
Application of the principles of comparative negligence to this case reveals the awkward effect of the Appellate Division's holding. Had defendant Jacob been found ninety-nine percent liable and Warnebold one percent liable, Jacob would have been liable for $18,364.50 (99% of $45,000 minus the PIP benefits received). Only the value of Warnebold's one percent liability, or $185.50, would have been deducted from the total verdict. However, under the Appellate Division's interpretation of the collateral-source statute, when Jacob's liability rises to 100%, he owes nothing because the total amount of settlement received from Warnebold must be deducted from the verdict. That a 100% liable defendant can end up paying nothing violates comparative negligence's basic tenet that "each tortfeasor is liable for the same percentage of negligence found attributable to him."
Rogers, supra, 147 N.J. Super. at 277. We cannot believe that by enacting the collateral-source statute, the Legislature intended to produce such an avulsive change in our law.
The traditional rules of comparative negligence, as applied to this case, would call for defendant's payment of $19,000: 100% of the jury verdicts, $45,000, minus the amount of PIP benefits, $26,000, already paid to plaintiff Joszef Kiss. We do not find offense to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 in that result.
III
Judgment reversed. The cause is remanded to the Law Division for entry there of judgment in accordance with this opinion.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, Garibaldi, and Stein join in this opinion.
Disposition
Judgment reversed. The cause is remanded to the Law Division for entry there of judgment in accordance with this opinion.
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