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Wiley v. Redd11/30/1994
. Bally was named in the third-party complaint on the belief that on the date of Wiley's injury it was the actual owner of the Redd residence. Bally apparently did not participate in the proceedings below, did not file briefs on appeal and has not otherwise participated in this matter. Where the context applies, "Redd" will hereafter denote all parties against whom relief was sought by Alarmco in its cross-claim and third-party complaint.
3 As noted above, the common law firefighter's rule has been modified by the 1985 enactment of NRS 41.139. NRS 41.139 reads in relevant part: 1. peace officer, fireman or emergency medical attendant may bring and maintain an action for damages for personal injury caused by the willful act of another, or by another's lack of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property, if the conduct causing the injury: (a) Occurred after the person who caused the injury knew or should have known of the presence of the peace officer, fireman or emergency medical attendant . . . . In Moody, we commented, with reference to the legislative history behind NRS 41.139, that the purpose of NRS 41.139 is to limit the application of the common law firefighter's rule. Apropos to the point, we stated:
An examination of the legislative history of NRS 41.139 leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the statute was intended as a limitation on the firefighter's rule and not as a codification of the rule. The legislative hearings . . . indicate that the Legislature specifically contemplated that the rule would continue as set forth in Steelman. . . . Rather than expanding the firefighter's rule to preclude recovery from those occasions where the injury was not related to the public servant's purpose for being present, NRS 41.139(1) was intended to narrow the firefighter's rule to permit recovery in instances where recovery was previously precluded. Although not explicitly stated in NRS 41.139(1), the legislative history of the statute clearly indicates the Legislature only intended the analysis to that of a general statute to apply where the injury was caused by the event giving rise to the public servant's presence. Id. at 325-26, 871 P.2d at 938-39 (citations omitted). The parties to this appeal raise issues pertaining to NRS 41.139; nevertheless, in light of our discussion in Moody, these issues are misplaced as NRS 41.139 operates as a statutory limitation only when the common law firefighter's rule bars recovery, which, as concluded above, is not the case here.
4 We nevertheless see propriety in the thought that Alarmco would be well advised to alert law enforcement authorities of hazardous conditions known by Alarmco to exist on their clients' premises.
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