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Wilson v. Lynch & Lynch Co.12/27/1994
d upon the concept that an attorney agrees to accept employment and receive payment conditioned upon resolution of the matter favorable to the client. Regardless of the size of the award, the attorney is entitled to that agreed-upon percentage irrespective of the amount of time spent by that attorney on the file. The size of the fee is not subject to review as long as it is not unreasonable in proportion to the sum recovered by the client. In other words, as long as the percentage is reasonable, the size of the fee generated should not be questioned. This syllogism is also predicated on the notion that the parties have entered into an arm's-length agreement for the attorney's services.
In Williamson v. Belovich (1993), 84 Ohio App.3d 628, 632-633, 617 N.E.2d 786, 789, the court upheld an attorney's entitlement under a contingent fee "contract to take fifty percent of all proceeds, including statutory attorney fees * * *." In obtaining the conclusion, the court cited Wilmington v. J.L Case Co. (C.A.8, 1986), 793 F.2d 909, which states:
"To our minds, to limit attorney compensation in that manner would be an unwarranted interference with a private contract. As the Eleventh Circuit has observed, a contingent fee contract represents the client's and the attorney's notions of a reasonable fee * * *." Id. Lt 923.
Under the position espoused by the majority, the contingent fee would, in essence, be significantly gelded, if not abolished, under such facts. In every case, a client dissatisfied with the compensation the attorney receives would be able to petition the court to review the fee agreement in relation to the work provided." I do not endorse, nor do I believe, that the Supreme Court of Ohio has sanctioned such strict scrutiny of fee-splitting arrangements.
In conclusion, the evidential table was sufficient to establish a question of fact that the appellant worked on the file, and that payment for these services was governed by a fee-splitting agreement accepted by the parties. Absent a patently unreasonable contingent fee arrangement, I would not require the appellant to "[remain] as co-counsel of record long enough to have rendered some legal services and to have maintained some responsibility for the case * * * " to earn his fee, thereby lessening the blow of the punch line from, as Justice Douglas stated: "the worst of the bad joke A about lawyers." Lansberry, 68 Ohio St.3d at 577, 629 N.E.2d at 437.
For obvious reasons, the analysis is dispositive of appellees' assigned error regarding the court's denial of their motion for attorney fees. Notwithstanding the foregoing, I concur with the result obtained by the majority in its treatment of appellees' assignment. Additionally, I concur with the majority's disposition of appellant's fraud allegation.
Therefore, I must respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
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