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Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann3/25/1994
sa loquitur instruction where the doctrine is clearly applicable to the evidence before the jury. See, e.g., State Farm v. Municipality of Anchorage, 788 P.2d 726, 730-31 (Alaska 1990)(holding judge's refusal to give res ipsa loquitur instruction was reversible error where doctrine was applicable and plaintiff did not purport to offer complete explanation of defendant's negligence); Davis v. Memorial Hospital, 58 Cal.2d 815, 26 Cal. Rptr. 633, 376 P.2d 561, 563 (1962)(holding it prejudicial and reversible error for trial judge "to refuse to give the requested [res ipsa loquitur ] instructions"); Terrell v. Lincoln Motel, Inc., 183 N.J. Super. 55, 443 A.2d 236, 238 (1982)("The failure to charge res ipsa [loquitur ], where applicable, constitutes reversible error.").
On the other hand, several decisions of this State and from the courts of other jurisdictions hold it is error for a trial judge to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur where the doctrine is clearly inapplicable to the evidence before it. See, e.g., B & K Rentals v. Universal Leaf Tobacco, 324 Md. 147, 162, 596 A.2d 640, 647 (1991)(holding that submitting case to the jury on theory of res ipsa loquitur was reversible error where doctrine was inapplicable because direct evidence was presented to the jury); Potomac Edison Co. v. Burdette, 70 Md. App. 566, 575-76, 521 A.2d 1276, 1281 (holding it reversible error to instruct jury on res ipsa loquitur where doctrine was clearly inapplicable due to fact that accident may have occurred in the absence of anyone's negligence), cert. denied, 310 Md. 129, 527 A.2d 50 (1987). See also Jones v. Davis, 183 Ga. App. 401, 359 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1987)("The law in Georgia is clear that it is error to [instruct the jury as to] the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where, as here, the cause of the incident is subject to proof by direct evidence since it 'is a doctrine of necessity to be applied, where otherwise appropriate, in cases where there is no evidence of consequence showing negligence on the part of the defendant.'" (Citation omitted)).
Finally, at least one state court has concluded the following with respect to cases where the applicability of the doctrine is somewhat unclear:
"In some cases the adequacy of the proof is a close question and in those instances giving the instruction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." (Emphasis added).
Turtenwald v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 55 Wis.2d 659, 201 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (1972) (citing Fehrman v. Smirl, 25 Wis.2d 645, 131 N.W.2d 314, 318 (1964)). See also 57B Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence ยง 2035, at 691 (2d ed. 1989)(supporting trial judge's exercise of discretion to decide whether res ipsa loquitur instruction is appropriate in cases where "the adequacy of the proof is a close question"). Unlike the two lines of cases remarked upon above, Turtenwald obviously suggests that a trial judge should have discretion to decide whether to give a res ipsa loquitur instruction where the evidence before the jury does not clearly require or preclude the application of the doctrine.
In the instant case, neither party has cited, nor have we found, any Maryland case which holds that a trial judge is under a mandatory obligation to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or which reverses a trial judge for the failure to give a res ipsa loquitur instruction. Therefore, this Court has not yet foreclosed the possibility that an exercise of discretion on the trial judge's part may be permissible, particularly in cases where res ipsa loquitur is questionable and the trial judge's instructions as to a general negligence theo
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