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Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann3/25/1994
ry sufficiently cover the area such that counsel may fit arguments into the instructions given.
In this respect, Maryland Rule 2-520(c) provides that a court "need not grant a requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given." A number of Maryland cases also assert the proposition that specifically requested jury instructions are unnecessary where the instructions given adequately encompass the field of law and a party's counsel has room to argue applicable law in light of the facts of the case. See Eagle-Picher v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 233, 604 A.2d 445, 471 (1992)(holding it is not error for trial judge to refuse to give specific instruction when general one is broad enough to allow party to argue properly); Aronstamn v. Coffey, 259 Md. 47, 50-51, 267 A.2d 741, 742-43 (1970)(holding that trial judge is under no obligation to give requested instruction, even though it may be a correct exposition of the law, if the matter is fairly covered by general instructions actually given).
Res ipsa loquitur is nothing more than one manner in which a general negligence theory is asserted by the plaintiff to an action. As one commentator has noted, "in its simplest form, res ipsa loquitur is merely descriptive of a negligence action in which the plaintiff offers circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence of the defendant's culpable conduct." David E. Seidelson, Res Ipsa Loquitur--The Big Umbrella, 25 Duq. L. Rev. 387, 387 (1987)(footnote omitted). As such, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur conceivable could fall within the ambit of a general negligence theory. We are unprepared to foreclose the possibility that a jury instruction concerning negligence in general may fairly cover the area of res ipsa loquitur, as long as the judge does not otherwise improperly preclude counsel from making such an argument. Absent a jury instruction which improperly negates such a theory, counsel would be free to present arguments regarding the permissible inferences the jury may reasonably draw from the circumstantial evidence before it. See Hanes v. State, Use of Lamm, 236 Md. 28, 34, 202 A.2d 364, 366 (1964)(finding a specific res ipsa loquitur instruction unnecessary because it was "inferentially presented" to the jury).
There is a general rule that negligence will not be inferred from the mere occurrence of an accident. In res ipsa loquitur cases, however, an inference of negligence is raised by the occurrence of an accident coupled with circumstances which invoke the doctrine. See Short v. Wells, 249 Md. 491, 496, 240 A.2d 224, 227 (1968); Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 19, 264 A.2d 851, 856 (1970). Thus, if the jury is told, as it was in the instant case, that the mere occurrence of an accident does not raise an inference of negligence, such an instruction would seem to preclude reliance upon the inference of negligence underlying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Therefore, if the judge does have any discretion to refuse a res ipsa loquitur instruction in a case where the doctrine potentially applies, and if the judge relies on the parties to argue the inferences to the jury, then the judge would be prohibited from instructing the jury that negligence may not be inferred from the mere occurrence of an accident. In such a case, the latter instruction could be taken by the jury as inconsistent with the inferences argued by the parties. See 3 Edward J. Devitt et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions ยง 80.08, at 142-43 (4th ed. 1987).
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