Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann3/25/1994
49, 51-52, 606 A.2d 305, 307 (1992)(inference of negligence may arise from circumstances of the case without shifting burden of proof to defendant). Under Maryland's tort law, successful reliance on res ipsa loquitur requires proof of the following three components:
"'"1.
A casualty of a sort which usually does not occur in the absence of negligence.
2.
Caused by an instrumentality within the defendant's exclusive control.
3.
Under circumstances indicating that the casualty did not result from the act or omission of the plaintiff."'"
Meda, 318 Md. at 423, 569 A.2d at 204 (quoting Hicks, 25 Md. App. at 516, 337 A.2d at 752, in turn quoting Leikach v. Royal Crown, 261 Md. 541, 547-48, 276 A.2d 81, 84 (1971)).
A plaintiff's reliance on res ipsa loquitur is generally necessitated, therefore, by the fact that direct evidence of negligence is either lacking or solely in the hands of the defendant. As stated by this Court in Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 19, 264 A.2d 851, 856 (1970), "relaxation of the normal rules of proof is thought to be justified because the instrumentality causing injury is in the exclusive control of the defendant, and it is assumed he is in the best position to explain how the accident happened." (Emphasis added). Antithetically, numerous Maryland cases have explained that a plaintiff's "attempt to establish specific grounds of alleged negligence precludes recourse to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." Smith v. Bernfeld, 226 Md. 400, 409, 174 A.2d 53, 57 (1961). See also Peterson, 258 Md. at 20, 264 A.2d at 857 (holding that res ipsa loquitur was unavailable because "plaintiff attempted to establish specific grounds of negligence"); Smith v. Baltimore Transit Co., 214 Md. 560, 566, 136 A.2d 386, 389 (1957)(stating that, "where the plaintiff himself proves the details of the happening and, having undertaken to prove the details, he has foregone reliance on res ipsa loquitur ").
The dilemma between the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and offering direct evidence of negligence is best summarized by the oft-quoted discussion in Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed, 202 Md. 253, 96 A.2d 241 (1953):
"In this case the plaintiffs themselves proved the details of the happening, foregoing reliance on res ipsa loquitur ; and, having undertaken to prove the details, they failed to show negligence on the part of the defendants. Indeed, they explained away the possible inference of negligence. Paradoxically, the plaintiffs proved too much and too little."
202 Md. at 263, 96 A.2d at 245. See Blankenship v. Wagner, 261 Md. 37, 39 & n.2, 273 A.2d 412, 413 & n.2 (1971); Isen v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 259 Md. 564, 575, 270 A.2d 476, 481 (1970); Roberts v. Cave, 257 Md. 582, 588, 263 A.2d 863, 866 (1970); Stoskin v. Prensky, 256 Md. 707, 715, 262 A.2d 48, 52 (1970). See also Swann, 95 Md. App. at 393, 620 A.2d at 1003. The question presented by the instant case is, therefore, whether the plaintiff attempted to prove the "details of the happening," thereby pre
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