Eisenmenger v. Ethicon3/24/1994
answer that question, it is necessary to read the phrase added by the 1985 amendment in the context of the existing qualifying language of the statute both before and after the added phrase. First, the only "claim" that is referred to in § 27-6-702, MCA, (and, in fact, the only "claim" referred to in the entire Act) is the claim for "malpractice," a defined term of art — which Ethicon, by that definition, cannot commit.
Second, according to § 27-6-702, MCA, the malpractice claim is tolled:
(i) as to "health care providers," which, again, is a defined term of art which does not include Ethicon; and
(ii) "as to all other persons or entities named in the application as necessary or proper parties" — which Ethicon could be, if it could commit "malpractice" as defined by the Act.
Third, while the "court action which might subsequently arise out of the same factual circumstances" might, arguably, include a products liability claim, again, the only claim for which the statute of limitations is tolled is the malpractice claim. That conclusion is buttressed by the sentence which immediately follows the phrase added in 1985 which states that " he running of the applicable limitation period in a malpractice claim does not begin again until 30 days after. . .". Section 27-6-702, MCA. Since the statute is very specific about when the statute of limitations on the malpractice claim begins to run again, it begs the question, assuming arguendo that claims besides the malpractice claim are tolled, when the statute of limitations on those latter claims begins to run after the panel's decision. The statute is silent on that point.
Therein lies the ambiguity. Section 27-6-702, MCA, does not specify any other claim, besides the malpractice claim, for which the statute of limitations is tolled, nor does it refer to any other claim, besides the malpractice claim, on which the applicable limitation period begins to run again after the 30 days specified in the statute has elapsed.
From a plain reading of the entire Act, in context and without resort to legislative history, one necessarily concludes that the Act, including its tolling provisions, only applies to malpractice claims involving health care providers.
What, then, did the 1985 amendment accomplish? It is an established rule of statutory construction that we presume that the legislature would not pass meaningless legislation, and that we must harmonize statutes relating to the same subject, giving effect to each. Montana Contractors' Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Highways (1986), 220 Mont. 392, 395, 715 P.2d 1056, 1058. Furthermore, § 1-2-101, MCA, mandates that " here there are several provisions or particulars, [in a statute] such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." Hence, the need to resort to legislative history. Under the Court's rationale, there is no other way to give effect to the added language, absent giving it the construction which this Court has on the basis of what we perceive to be the intent of the legislature as gathered from the legislative history.
Were the legislature's intent clear, I would agree with the Court's interpretation of the statute. I do not concede, however, that the legislative history is as clearly indicative of the legislature's intent in enacting the 1985 amendments as our opinion seems to suggest.
Literally, the only group of persons actually referred to in the legislative history to HB 738 (enacted as Ch. 332, L. 1985) as being included within the added tolling language, are nurses — who, according to the legislative history, did not want to be covered by
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Montana Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|