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Puso v. Kenyon3/10/1994
ury within one of nine categories of injuries delineated in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a, which included "permanent significant disfigurement," now commonly designated as "type three" injury. Oswin v. Shaw, supra, 129 N.J. at 295, 315.
The original act was vastly modified by the passage of the New Jersey Automobile Insurance Freedom of Choice and Cost Containment Act of 1984, L. 1983, c. 362. Thereafter, the original act was itself specifically amended September 8, 1988, effective January 1, 1989.
The legislative history of the 1988 amendment is encompassed within Senate Labor, Industry and Professions Committee Statement to S-2637 (June 16, 1988). The proposed bill was conditionally vetoed by then-Governor Thomas H. Kean, who issued a statement describing what now constitutes New Jersey's no-fault insurance law:
The verbal threshold contained in this recommendation is patterned after that in force in New York State. (See New York Insurance Law ยงยง 5102, 5104). This verbal threshold specifically sets forth those injuries which will be considered "serious." Lawsuits for non-economic injuries, such as pain and suffering, will be allowed for these enumerated "serious injuries," only. It is my intention that the term "serious injury ," as defined in this recommendation, shall be construed in a manner that is consistent with the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Licari v. Elliott [57 N.Y.2d 230, 441 N.E.2d 1088, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570 (N.Y. 1982)]. Whether a plaintiff has sustained a "serious injury" must be decided by the court, and not the jury. Otherwise, the bill's essential purpose of closing the courthouse door to all lawsuits except those involving bona fide serious injuries will be diluted and the bill's effectiveness will be greatly diminished. In addition, strict construction of the verbal threshold is essential; any judicial relaxation of this plain language will impede the intent of maintaining the substantial benefits of no-fault at an affordable price.
[Governor's Reconsideration and Recommendation Statement, Senate No. 2637 at 3-4 (Aug. 4, 1988).]
One change resulting from this amendment was the modification of the third category of exempt injuries. The original statute included the exemption, "permanent significant disfigurement." The 1988 amendment changed this language to "significant disfigurement." Neither statute defined the word "significant"; however, it is clear that the word "significant" is used synonymously with the phrase "serious injury ."
As pointed out by Justice Clifford in Oswin, supra, 129 N.J. at 315-16:
Unlike the New York statute, which requires serious injury ," New Jersey's no-fault statute does not expressly use that term, requiring only that the injury fit one of the specified types. The distinction is of some moment only because the New York statute defines "serious injury" with a list of nine types of injury that is identical to the list used in the New Jersey statute; a plaintiff who sues under the New York statute merely alleges a "serious injury," often without specifying the type of injury. Because the New Jersey no-fault statute is based on New York's, we use the standards set in Licari, supra, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570, 441 N.E.2d 1088, for evaluating plaintiff's injuries.
In Licari the New York Court of Appeals evaluated only two of the injury types: "significant limitation of use of a body function or system" and the 90/180-day requirement. In respect of the first category, the court said:
The word "significant" as used in the statute pertaining to 'limitation of use of a body function or system' should be construed to mean something mo
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