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Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Am. Line Bldrs. Apprenticeship Training Program3/2/1994
d he received any instruction from a professional, the exclusion for professional liability does not apply."
CIC's argument on appeal is essentially the same argument rejected by the trial court. We must reject it, as well.
The rules of construction for interpretation of insurance contracts are well known. Issues concerning coverage must be determined by a reasonable construction of the contract in conformity with the intention of the parties as gathered from the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the language employed. Dealers Dairy Products, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. (1960), 170 Ohio St. 336, 10 O.O.2d 424, 164 N.E.2d 745. Where contract provisions are ambiguous, they will be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. King v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380.
The trial court correctly focused on the claim for relief against the insured rather than the general activity that gave rise to it. The nature of the claim is determined by the duty of care concerned, and its alleged breach.
Simple negligence contemplates breach of a duty of ordinary care. "Malpractice" contemplates breach of a higher duty, one which requires the application of knowledge and skill superior to that of the ordinary person in order to change, modify, or improve the condition of another. When a person who owes that duty to another because of the relationship between them fails to employ it, the actor will be held liable for injuries to the other person proximately resulting from that failure. Such persons must use the care and skill reasonable in the light of their superior learning and experience. For such persons the relevant standard of conduct is "good practice," not a minimum standard of care.
The relationship between Lang and ALBAT's instructor was that of teacher and pupil. It no doubt required that the instructor possess specialized knowledge and skill in the trade in which Lang was being instructed. However, according to Lang's claim, ALBAT's instructor was required only to school Lang in the trade and to supervise his efforts to learn, not to himself exercise that specialized knowledge and skill to change, modify, or improve Lang's condition. That, in essence, is the role of a "professional," such as a physician or attorney, into whose care a patient or client places himself or herself. The instructor's role here was not to change Lang or his condition, but to impart knowledge by which Lang could do so. Their relationship did not place the instructor in the position of a professional, and his alleged negligence does not constitute a form of malpractice for which only a professional may be liable, but merely a breach of his duty of ordinary care.
The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment for ALBAT, finding that the insurance contract required CIC to defend and indemnify ALBAT against Lang's claim. Its judgment will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
WOLFF and FREDERICK N. YOUNG, JJ., concur.
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