WIGGINS v. EDWARDS
3/7/1994
Myrtle Wiggins (Wiggins) appeals an Order granting summary judgment to Respondent (Edwards) on a statute of limitations defense. We affirm.
FACTS
On November 11, 1988, Wiggins was in a three car accident involving automobiles driven by Edwards and another defendant. She sustained back injury for which she was hospitalized four days.
On November 15, 1992, 3 years and 4 days from the date of the accident, Wiggins served Edwards with a summons and complaint. Edwards moved for summary judgment, contending the claim was barred by S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-535 (Supp. 1992), which provides a three (3) year statute of limitations in personal injury actions. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. Wiggins appeals.
ISSUES
1. When did the statute of limitations begin
to run?
2. Should the statute of limitations be
tolled due to insanity?
3. Should the statute of limitations be
tolled due to physical disability?
4. Is Respondent equitably estopped
from asserting the statute of limitations
defense?
5. Does enforcement of the statute of limitations
violate public policy?
6. Does the issue of statute of limitations
present a jury issue?
A. Statute of Limitations
Wiggins contends that the trial court erred in holding that the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the accident. Wiggins argues that the statute here began to run at the time she was actually able to investigate her case, discover a cause of action existed, and determine who or what caused her injury. We disagree.
S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-535 (Supp. 1992) requires that an action for
The exercise of reasonable diligence means
simply that an injured party must act with
some promptness where the facts and circumstances
of an injury would put a person
of common knowledge and experience
on notice that some right of his has been
invaded or that some claim against another
party might exist. The statute of limitations
begins to run from this point and not
when advice of counsel is sought or a full-blown
theory of recovery developed.
Snell v. Columbia Gun Exchange, Inc., 276 S.C. 301, 303, 278 S.E.2d 333, 334 (1981). This is an objective determination. Wilson v. Shannon, 299 S.C. 512, 386 S.E.2d 257 (Ct.App. 1989).
Moreover, the focus is upon the date of discovery of the injury, not the date of discovery of the wrongdoer:
The important date under the discovery
rule is the date that a plaintiff discovers
the injury, not the date of the discovery of
the identity of another alleged wrongdoer.
If, on the date of injury, a plaintiff knows
or should know that she had some claim
against someone else, the statute of limitations
begins to run for all claims based on
that injury.
Tollison v. B & J Machinery Co., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 618, 620 (D.S.C. 1993).
Wiggins erroneously applies a subjective test to establish the time of discovery of her injury. This does not accord with
B. Insanity
Wiggins claims that the injuries sustained in the accident rendered her "insane" until November 21, 1988; therefore, the statute of limitations was tolled until this time. We disagree.
S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-40 (Supp. 1992) (the tolling statute) provides in part that the statute of limitations is tolled if the plaintiff is: (1) within the age of eighteen years; (2) insane; or (3) imprisoned on a criminal or civil charge or in execution under the sentence of a crim
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