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WIGGINS v. EDWARDS3/7/1994
inal court for a less term than his natural life. . . .
The general rule as to the standard for insanity under tolling statutes is that:
Insanity or mental incompetency that tolls
the statute of limitations consists of a mental
condition which precludes understanding
the nature or effects of one's acts, an
incapacity to manage one's affairs, an inability
to understand or protect one's rights,
because of an over-all inability to function
in society, or the mental condition is such
as to require care in a hospital.
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions ยง 117 at 159-169 (internal footnotes omitted).
Here, the confusion or disorientation suffered by Wiggins does not constitute "insanity". She did not lose consciousness nor did she sustain any type of head injury in the accident. See Annotation, Proof of unadjudged incompetency which prevent running of statute of limitations, 9 ALR2d 964.
C. Physical Disability
Wiggins contends that her physical disability should toll the statute of limitations. We disagree.
Any amendment to the disabilities provided in the tolling statute is a matter for the legislature. This Court is without authority to alter the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139, 417 S.E.2d 541 (1992).
D. Equitable Estoppel
Wiggins contends that Edwards is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitation as a defense since he was the cause of the accident and was aware of the impending litigation. We disagree.
A defendant may be estopped from claiming the statute of limitations as a defense if "the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute had been induced by the defendant's conduct." Dillon Co. Sch. Dist. Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal, 286 S.C. 207, 218, 332 S.E.2d 555, 561 (Ct.App. 1985), (cert. granted) 287 S.C. 234, 337 S.E.2d 697 (1985), cert. dismissed 288 S.C. 468, 343 S.E.2d 613 (1986). This may consist of an express representation that the claim will be settled without litigation or conduct that suggests a lawsuit is not necessary. Id.; Rink v. Richland Memorial Hospital, ___ S.C. ___, 422 S.E.2d 747 (1992).
Nothing in this record supports equitable estoppel. No showing whatsoever was made by Wiggins that Edwards induced her failure to comply with the statute of limitations.
E. Public Policy
Wiggins argues the enforcement of the statute of limitations to bar her action violates public policy. To the contrary, statute of limitations rest on public policy. See Harrison v. Holsenbeck, 208 Ga. 410, 67 S.E.2d 311 (1951).
F. Jury Question
Wiggins contends that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to her, creates a jury question as to whether the claim is time barred. We disagree.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Rule 56, SCRCP. Here, there is no question that the accident occurred on November 11, 1989. It is on that date that Wiggins should have known that a cause of action accrued. Moreover, the record shows no conduct on the part of the defendant establishing estoppel. Therefore, summary judgment was proper. Gadsden v. Southern Railway, 262 S.C. 590, 206 S.E.2d 882 (1974).
Affirmed.
FINNEY, TOAL and MOORE, JJ., and WILLIAM T. HOWELL, Acting Associate Justice, concur.
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