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Dyke v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office5/20/1993
f temporary benefits under Allee. See Kraus v. Artcraft Sign Co., 710 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1985) (a court should not read nonexistent provisions into the Workers' Compensation Act).
C.
In Allee v. Contractors, Inc., supra, our supreme court unequivocally rejected the principle, and expressly overruled those cases holding, that temporary disability benefits cease when an injured employee has reached maximum improvement but is undergoing an evaluation for vocational rehabilitation and is awaiting an administrative decision on the need for such a program.
This determination was based upon the recognition that a disabled worker may attain maximum medical improvement from an injury or occupation disease and still not have reached maximum industrial efficiency. It was also based upon the significance of vocational rehabilitation as a reliable factor in assessing the extent of an employee's permanent industrial disability and the proposition that an effective program of vocational rehabilitation can mitigate the effects of a medical disability by restoring the worker to a higher level of industrial capacity than would otherwise exist if vocational rehabilitation had not taken place.
Applying Allee to the facts of this case, therefore, leads us to conclude that the claimant was entitled to temporary disability benefits even after she reached maximum medical improvement until August 1990, when the employer voluntarily began payment of temporary disability benefits. Hence, the Panel's determination is not supported by law or the facts in this case, and it therefore must be set aside. See ยง 8-43-308, C.A.S. (1992 Cum. Supp.).
II.
Claimant also contends that she is entitled to temporary disability benefits subsequent to October 18, 1986, because she was not at fault for her separation from the employer and had reasonably sought work. However, we agree with the Panel that Monfort and Lunsford are not applicable here because the claimant had already reached maximum medical improvement. Thus, as set forth in part I, Allee is dispositive.
Accordingly, the Panel's order is set aside, and the cause is remanded for determination of the appropriate award of temporary disability benefits for the period between October 13, 1986, and August 1990, consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
JUDGE CRISWELL and JUDGE REED concur.
Disposition
ORDER SET ASIDE AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
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