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GUPTA v. NEW BRITAIN GENERAL HOSPITAL12/31/1996
1063 (N.D.Ga. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Burke v. Emory University, 177 Ga. App. 30, 32, 338 S.E.2d 500 (1985); cf. Owens v. New Britain General Hospital, 229 Conn. 592, 606, 643 A.2d 233 (1994) (judicial deference accorded hospital administration's decision to revoke staff privileges).
Educational discretion is, nonetheless, not limitless. The plaintiff properly observes that, in exercising its professional judgment, an educational institution does not have license to act arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith. Such a substantial departure from academic norms may implicate substantive due process; see Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, supra, 474 U.S. 224; or may constitute the breach of an educational contract by a private institution. See Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, supra, 862 F.2d 577 (implicit in contract is promise not to act capriciously or arbitrarily); Paulsen v. Golden Gate University, 25 Cal.3d 803, 808-809, 602 P.2d 778, 159 Cal.Rptr. 858 (1979) (en banc) (applying arbitrary and capricious standard to private school).
In the present case, therefore, the issue is not the jurisprudential basis for the plaintiff's claim but its factual
underpinning. The plaintiff bears a heavy burden in proving that his dismissal resulted from arbitrary, capricious, or bad faith conduct on the part of the hospital. To prevail, he must show that the hospital's decision had no "discernable rational basis." See Holert v. University of Chicago , 751 F. Sup. 1294, 1301 (N.D.Ill. 1990). To rebut the hospital's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff was required, therefore, to provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of material facts in this regard. See Doty v. Mucci, supra, 238 Conn. 805-806.
The plaintiff contends that the affidavit he submitted in opposition to the hospital's motion for summary judgment was sufficient to meet his evidentiary burden. We disagree. Read liberally, the plaintiff's affidavit shows only that the plaintiff's performance was not so
deficient as to warrant his dismissal until the final year of his residency and that, in some respects, the plaintiff had performed satisfactorily up to that point. The plaintiff, in effect, asks us to conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have inferred from these observations that: (1) he was a qualified resident; and that, therefore, (2) the hospital's decision to dismiss him was based on caprice or motivated by bias. We decline to construct such inferential bridges or to substitute the plaintiff's appraisal of his performance for that of the hospital. See Haynes v. Hinsdale Hospital, 872 F. Sup. 542, 545 (N.D.Ill. 1995) (plaintiff's difference in judgment with regard to her performance does not constitute a genuine issue of material fact).
We conclude that the plaintiff failed to adduce material facts to survive a motion for summary judgment on his claim of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or bad faith on the part of the hospital. The trial court's decision to this effect must, therefore, be upheld.
C
The plaintiff's final claim is that the hospital, even in the exercise of its academic judgment, dismissed him improperly because his dismissal violated the hospital's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court, without explicitly addressing this claim, determined that the hospital had been sensitive to the
plaintiff's shortcomings and had "set up elaborate procedural mechanisms to insure fairness" in the dismissal process. Accordingly, the trial court found that the hospital had not acted in bad faith. The plaintiff now contends that
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