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CARRIERO v. BOROUGH OF NAUGATUCK12/17/1996
Shop, 42 Conn. App. 599, 615, 682 A.2d 1016 (1996). Accordingly, we conclude that " etirement or survivor benefits under 7-433c" refers solely to disability pension and permanent partial disability benefits established in that statute.
Naugatuck argues that the plaintiff is receiving a windfall by collecting both his regular pension and the permanent partial disability benefit under § 7-433c. Naugatuck claims that this double recovery is contrary to the legislative intent of § 7-433b (b) because both benefits arose from the same cause, i.e., the 42.5 percent disability of the plaintiff's heart.
As a general rule, if two governmental benefits arise from the same cause, a person cannot be entitled to both benefits.
Middletown v. Local Union No. 1073, 1 Conn. App. 58, 64, 467 A.2d 1258 (1983), cert. dismissed, 192 Conn. 803, 471 A.2d 244 (1984). The aim of the legislature when it enacted § 7-433c was to limit the payment of dual governmental benefits arising from the same cause, i.e., heart disease. Id.
Here, the commissioner specifically found that the plaintiff was awarded a retirement pension based solely on his length of service and that he was eligible for that pension regardless of his disability. In addition, the commissioner found that the plaintiff suffered a disability to his heart that entitled him to permanent partial disability benefits under § 7-433c. These are separate and distinct benefits. The pension and the disability benefits do not arise from the same cause and, therefore, do not implicate the limitation of § 7-433b (b). The statute prohibits only the receipt of hypertension disability benefits and a hypertension pension that together exceed 100 percent of an active duty officer's compensation. A pension for long years of service is not a factor in the calculation.
This court is satisfied that this interpretation is consistent with the language of the statute and equitable to a longtime service officer who becomes disabled. A thirty year veteran of the police department, vested with pension rights, should not be limited to the same benefits as a disabled rookie.
Finally, this court must give due deference to the board's interpretation of the statutes it enforces. "Although the interpretation of statutes is ultimately a question of law . . . it is the well established practice of this court to accord great deference to the construction given statute by the agency charged with its enforcement. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 43 Conn. App. 133, 138, 682 A.2d 1068 (1996), citing
Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 496, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 781, 93 L.Ed.2d 819 (1986).
The board determined that the ceiling of § 7-433b (b) applied solely to the two benefits under § 7-433c, that is, the permanent partial disability benefits and the disability pension. The board's decision relied on Costello v. Fairfield, 214 Conn. 189, 193, 571 A.2d 93 (1990). The Supreme Court in Costello affirmed the board's decision to allow a supplemental award of specific indemnity payments, holding that " ecause the Heart and Hypertension Act is remedial legislation, we should not ourselves enlarge upon the limitations it imposes on recovery." Id., 194, citing Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 59, 566 A.2d 670 (1989); see also Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 435, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988). Similarly, this court will not limit the plaintiff's recovery beyond the clear and specific mandates of § 7-433b (b).
We conclude that the purpose of § 7-433b (b) is to prevent
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