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Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate Inc.12/16/1996
he introduction of relevant parol evidence or the issue resolved by strictly construing the clause against its author. Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 399 A.2d 1374 (1979). See Colgan, (supra) , 553 A.2d at 145, in which the Vermont Supreme Court, noting the applicability of the objective law of contracts to the interpretation of exculpatory clauses, pointed out that, "it is the degree of clarity that the language must convey in order to achieve a particular legal result which is the crucial question." Id. That means, in Vermont, the court said, that because "such disclaimers are exculpatory, they must be construed strictly against the party relying on them." Id.
The critical issue on this appeal is whether the exculpatory clause in the lock-box agreement is sufficient to exculpate the respondent from liability resulting from its own negligence. The answer lies in the intention of the parties, which, under the objective law of contracts, is determined by the language of the subject clause. We agree with the petitioners that the clause is ambiguous and its scope is, at best, unclear. Because it does not clearly, unequivocally, specifically, and unmistakably express the parties' intention to exculpate the respondent from liability resulting from its own negligence, the clause is insufficient for that purpose.
The first sentence of the exculpatory clause recites that the respondent is not an insurer against the loss of the petitioners' personal property. The second sentence then relieves the respondent of the responsibility for any such loss. In short, it places the homeowner, as seller, on notice that the listing or selling broker is not "an insurer against the loss of personal property" and thus releases the broker from the responsibility of such losses. Very clearly that clause may logically be interpreted as applying only to those situations in which, without negligence on the part of the respondent, a person to whom the house is being shown steals the petitioners' property. There is nothing in the clause or, indeed, in the context, that would suggest a different or broader intent. In fact, putting the matter in context leads to the conclusion that the parties did not contemplate that this clause would insulate the respondent from liability for it own negligence. We conclude that the exculpatory clause plainly does not address thefts occurring as a result of the respondent's negligence.
Nor does the exculpatory clause in the listing contract pass muster. That clause protects the respondent from responsibility for "vandalism, theft or damage of any nature to the property." Here again, there simply is no clear, unequivocal expression of the parties' intention that included in that exclusion was damage or injury caused by the respondent's own negligence. Indeed, the clause is devoid of any language manifesting any such intention.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REINSTATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.
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