Aetna Insurance Co. v. Aaron12/4/1996
either the common elements of the condominium or the condominium unit located below Aaron's unit; . . . .
The court also concluded that Aetna was obligated to defend Aaron in the Warrington suit and to reimburse him for the costs and attorneys' fees he incurred in connection with the declaratory judgment action.
On appeal, Aetna contends that the trial court improperly "extended" the scope of the Policy's coverage. It maintains that the Council did not assert a claim to recover "for" property damage sustained by a third party, and that the repairs to the Glass Enclosure do not constitute "property damage", as defined in the Policy. Central to Aetna's argument is its claim that the owned property exclusion bars coverage under the Policy. Aaron essentially renews the arguments he asserted below.
Discussion
I.
Summary judgment is not a procedural shortcut to avoid a trial. Rather, it is an appropriate method of resolving cases, prior to trial, when the facts are undisputed. Seaboard Surety Company v. Richard F. Kline, Inc., 91 Md. App. 236, 603 A.2d 1357 (1992). To grant summary judgment, a trial court must determine that there are no material facts in dispute, and that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501; see Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737-38, 625 A.2d 1005 (1993); Bagwell v. Peninsula Regional Med. Ctr., 106 Md. App. 470, 488, 665 A.2d 297 (1995), cert. denied, 341 Md. 172, 669 A.2d 1360 (1996); Bits "N" Bytes Computer Supplies, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 97 Md. App. 557, 576-77, 631 A.2d 485 (1993), cert. denied, 333 Md. 385, 635 A.2d 425 (1994). In the absence of disputed material facts, an appellate court will review the trial court's grant of summary judgment to insure that the trial court reached the correct legal result. Beatty, 330 Md. at 737; Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 578 A.2d 1202 (1990).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must produce evidence demonstrating that there is a dispute as to material facts. Scroggins v. Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 645 A.2d 1160 (1994). A fact is material if the outcome of the case depends on how the factfinder resolves the disputed fact. King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111, 492 A.2d 608 (1985); Keesling v. State, 288 Md. 579, 583, 420 A.2d 261 (1980); Miller v. Fairchild, 97 Md. App. 324, 340, 629 A.2d 1293, cert. denied, 333 Md. 172, 634 A.2d 46 (1993). Moreover, the trial court must view all facts, and the possible inferences from the facts, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Bagwell, 106 Md. App. at 488.
Applying summary judgment principles, we must resolve whether the trial court properly concluded that Aetna has a duty to defend and indemnify Aaron. This task requires us to construe the scope of Aetna's liability coverage, in order to determine if the Policy extends to expenses incurred by an insured to remediate a hazardous condition on the insured's property, for the purpose of preventing imminent and further harm to third-party property. We think that it does. We conclude that, if Aaron's property caused actual damage to property of another, and there was imminent risk of additional harm if preventative measures were not implemented, and the insured had a duty to remediate, then the Policy protects the insured for the fair and reasonable costs of necessary remedial measures, but only to the extent that the repairs were not merely to benefit the insured's property. In reaching our conclusion, we focus first on the general principles that govern construction of insurance contracts.
The "duty to defend is
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