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Aetna Insurance Co. v. Aaron12/4/1996
terms of the agreement. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 779; Cochran, 337 Md. at 98; Scarlett, 109 Md. App. at 290. The language of the contract is thus the "primary source" to determine the parties' intentions. Scarlett, 109 Md. App. at 291.
In construing the language in an insurance policy, courts accord the words their usual, ordinary, and accepted meaning, unless the parties intended to use the words in a technical sense. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 779; Cochran, 337 Md. at 104. A word's usual, ordinary, and accepted meaning is determined by the meaning that a reasonably prudent layperson "would attach to the term." Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 781; see also Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 488 A.2d 486 (1985). Further, the court considers the policy as a whole in determining the intention of the parties. Nolt v. USF&G; 329 Md. 52, 617 A.2d 578 (1993); Finci v. American Cas. Co. of Reading Pennsylvania, 323 Md. 358, 593 A.2d 1069 (1991); Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 74 Md. App. 539, 539 A.2d 239 (1988).
If the contractual language is clear and unambiguous, we presume that the parties meant what they actually said, regardless of what they may have actually intended. Scarlett, 109 Md. App. at 291. "Where the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction and we 'must presume that the parties meant what they expressed.'" Shapiro v. Massengill, 105 Md. App. 743, 661 A.2d 202, cert. denied, 341 Md. 28, 668 A.2d 36 (1995) (quoting General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261-62, 492 A.2d 1306 (1985)). Courts may consider extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of a policy term only if it is ambiguous. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 779.
With these principles in mind, we turn to an examination of the Policy and the parties' claims. Aetna essentially denies any obligation to indemnify or defend Aaron, because the remedial measures were performed exclusively on Aaron's own property, the preventative measures do not constitute damages in Aetna's view, and the injured third party is not the one who has lodged the claim for damages. Aetna urges us to adopt a construction of the term "damages" that is limited to actual loss sustained directly by third party property. Moreover, Aetna asserts that the Council's claim for reimbursement for the cost of repairs to the Glass Enclosure is not embodied within the Policy term "for damages". Based on the owned property exclusion, Aetna would also foreclose protection for preventative measures undertaken on the insured's property to avoid prospective harm to third-party property.
Conversely, Aaron asserts that the plain meaning of the words in the Policy necessarily includes coverage for repairs to the Glass Enclosure, because the claim is "for damages because of...property damage." Aaron also argues that the owned property exclusion does not preclude coverage for repairs to the insured's property, if the repairs are made to prevent imminent damage to third-party property that has already sustained harm due to a dangerous condition on the insured's property.
In the area of environmental pollution, the issue of whether "response" costs or remediation expenses constitute "damages" has been extensively litigated. Anderson Dev. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 49 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 1995). See also Maryland Cas. Co. v. Wausau Chem. Corp., 809 F. Supp. 680, 690-1 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (compiling cases). Similarly, numerous jurisdictions have considered whether an owned property exclusion forecloses recovery for the costs of environmental response measures employed on an insured's own property. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Quinn
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