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Washington v. Market Transition Facility12/3/1996
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRESSLER, P.J.A.D.
This controversy requires us once again to address the statute of limitations prescribed by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1 for the commencement of an action against an automobile insurer for payment of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. The precise issue before us is when does the statute begin to run where the insurer makes a voluntary partial payment of medical expenses. We reject the insurer's contention where later expenses are voluntarily paid that the controlling date is the date on which the insured's oldest uncompensated expense was incurred. We hold, rather, that the triggering event is the last payment actually made. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint.
The relevant facts are simple and undisputed. Plaintiff sustained soft-tissue injuries on January 23, 1993, when the automobile in which she was a passenger was struck by another vehicle. Not owning an automobile herself, and having no other source of PIP benefits, plaintiff made claim against her driver's insurer, Market Transition Facility, and HCM Insurance, its servicing carrier. Plaintiff received emergency room care immediately following the accident at St. Francis Hospital for which she was billed $408.74. She also began treating with Dr. Arthur Taubman and Hudson Physical Therapy Services, and incurred a bill from Jersey City Imaging in the amount of $950.00. Insofar as we can determine from this record, the insurer never paid the bills of St. Francis Hospital or Jersey City Imaging. It did, however, make partial payments from time to time to Dr. Taubman and Hudson Physical Therapy. The last payments to each were made on August 9, 1993, leaving a balance due to Dr. Taubman of $1,529.20 and a balance due to Hudson Physical Therapy of $4,111.00. The insurer having refused to make any additional payments, plaintiff commenced this action to recover them on June 20, 1995, less than two years after the last payment.
Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on statute-of-limitation grounds, taking the position that the two years permitted by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1 started to run on January 23, 1993, the date on which plaintiff incurred the unpaid bill for emergency room treatment and began to treat, on a partial payment basis, with Dr. Taubman and Hudson Physical Therapy. The trial Judge rejected plaintiff's argument that since August 9, 1993, was the date of last payment, she had two years from that date in which to bring suit. The trial court reasoned as follows:
Under the statute, 39:6A-13.1, which addresses the statute of limitations for PIP claims, a suit is timely filed if brought within two years of an incurred expense or loss, and within four years of the accident. The action must be commenced within two years after the first unpaid expense has been incurred, provided that the action is started within four years.
This is the statute of limitation regardless of the date of the last reimbursement. The issue of last reimburse-ment becomes important only after the initial four-year period from the date of accident has expired. At that point, one looks to the date of last payment to extend the statute before four years. In reaching this determination, the Court has relied upon the decision in Bell v. Western [ Employer's Ins. Co., 173 N.J. Super. 60, 413 A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1980)].
The trial Judge's error derived from a confusion between the basic limitations period provided for by the statute and its extension where payments have been made. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1a provides as follows:
Every action for the paym
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