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Colorado Permanente Medical Group11/12/1996
neral damages statute, section 13-64-302 is not ambiguous on its face. While Evans may be correct in her assertion that section 13-64-302 was passed in the same tort reform spirit as the general damages statute and contains a similar cap on noneconomic damages, this in no way diminishes the fact that the language of the two statutes is significantly different. Section 13-64-302 unequivocally states that the "total amount recoverable for a course of care for all defendants" attributable to noneconomic damages shall not exceed $250,000, "present value per patient."
In this case, there was one patient for whom there was one "course of care." The plain language of the statute limits Evans to one total recovery of $250,000 in noneconomic damages. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and hold that the cap on noneconomic damages in section 13-64-302 is applied on a "per patient" basis.
V.
Lastly, the Providers claim that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's reduction of the award against them for past medical expenses that Kaiser had already paid as the decedent's health insurer. The trial court had determined that Kaiser, by virtue of providing the decedent's health insurance, had paid approximately $40,000 of the $46,000 in medical expenses incurred and awarded. It deducted this amount from Evans's award for past medical expenses, reasoning that Evans would otherwise receive a double recovery. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Kaiser's payment of the decedent's medical expenses fell within the "contract exception" of section 13-21-111.6, 6A C.R.S. (1987), and thus should not have been deducted from the jury award. Evans, 902 P.2d at 876. We reverse the court of appeals, and remand for modification of the judgment consistent with this opinion.
A.
At common law, the collateral source rule provided that "compensation or indemnity received by an injured party from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer and to which he has not contributed, will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer." Kistler v. Halsey, 173 Colo. 540, 545, 481 P.2d 722, 724 (1971). "The purpose of the collateral source rule was to prevent the defendant from receiving credit for such compensation and thereby reduce the amount payable as damages to the injured party." Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Colo. 1992). "The rule evolved around the common sense notion that a tortfeasor ought not be excused because the victim was compensated by another source, often insurance." Quinones v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 1986).
Section 13-21-111.6 codifies the common law collateral source rule, and modifies it to limit the circumstances under which a plaintiff may receive double compensation for an injury . The statute requires reduction of tort damages awards by the amount a plaintiff "has been or will be wholly or partially indemnified or compensated for his loss by any other person, corporation, insurance company, or fund in relation to the injury, damage, or death sustained . . . ." ยง 13-21-111.6, 6A C.R.S. (1987). The statute, however, contains a "contract exception" provision which states that a "verdict shall not be reduced by the amount by which [the plaintiff] . . . has been or will be wholly or partially indemnified or compensated by a benefit paid as a result of a contract entered into and paid for by or on behalf of [the
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