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Kuzara v. State Fund11/14/1996
ontrary to the Court's implicit suggestion, the Workers' Compensation Court did not "find" all of her testimony credible in all particulars; indeed, it could hardly have done so since the State Fund had not presented its version of the "facts." Moreover, the Court's suggestion that, in successfully obtaining a directed verdict on the notice issue without the necessity of putting on its case, the State Fund somehow chose not to rebut or contradict the portions of Kuzara's testimony which did not relate specifically to the notice question at issue in its motion for directed verdict is disingenuous at very least. Kuzara's testimony on matters apart from the conversations she had with Spring Creek personnel within 30 days of the date of her alleged injury does not establish "facts" for any purpose other than determining whether the notice required by § 39-71-603, MCA (1993), was given and is not relevant to the issue before us as stated at the outset of the Court's decision.
I also disagree with the standard under which the Court has chosen to review the Workers' Compensation Court's decision in this matter. The issue before us is whether that court erred in directing a verdict on the notice question. Our standard in reviewing a court's decision to direct a verdict certainly is not whether the court's decision is "clearly erroneous." Nor do I agree that the Workers' Compensation Court's determination that Kuzara presented insufficient evidence to establish notice is a "finding of fact" subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Questions relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to meet statutory requirements are questions of law subject to de novo review by this Court to determine whether they are correct. Thus, while I recognize that matters relating to standards of review often seem esoteric or unimportant to some, I register my strenuous objection to what the Court is doing here in applying an incorrect standard of review.
The reason the standard of review matters here is this: under the standard for reviewing findings of fact, this Court need not rely on any legal authority in support of its ultimate conclusion regarding whether the trial court's findings of fact are sufficiently supported by the record. That is, under the "clearly erroneous" standard, we need only review the record and apply the three-part clearly erroneous test. The Court apparently chooses this standard here because — as will become more apparent later — no legal authority exists for the conclusion it reaches. The only way in which the Court can reach the result it seeks is to skewer the standard of review. I cannot agree.
In addition to applying the wrong standard of review, the Court also misapplies the "clearly erroneous" standard it has chosen. It never determines, pursuant to the first prong of that test, whether the trial court's alleged "finding" is supported by substantial credible evidence; instead, it proceeds directly to its determination — under the second part of the "clearly erroneous" standard of review — that the Workers' Compensation Court "misapprehended the effect of the evidence" before it relating to notice. One can only suppose that this is because the Court is aware that the decision it purports to review as a "finding of fact" is not a factual finding at all and, therefore, is not susceptible to a record review to determine whether it is supported by substantial credible evidence.
I do agree with two portions of the Court's opinion. First, immediately below its "Discussion" heading, the Court correctly states the issue before us as whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in granting the State Fund's motion for a directed verdi
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