Fieldcrest Cannon Inc. v. Fireman''s Fund Insurance Co.11/5/1996
at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. Further, a prima facie showing for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that the plaintiff demonstrate the following: (1) the defendant "engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which was intended to cause and did cause (3) severe emotional distress." Bryant v. Thalhimer Brothers, Inc., 113 N.C. App. 1, 6-7, 437 S.E.2d 519, 522 (1993), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 71, 445 S.E.2d 29 (1994).
In both contexts "the term 'severe emotional distress' means any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so." Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. "Mere temporary fright, disappointment or regret will not suffice." Id. Further, in the context of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the element of "extreme and outrageous conduct," has been defined as "'conduct [which] exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society.'" Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 196, 254 S.E.2d 611, 622 (1979) (quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts § 12, at 56 (4th ed. 1971)). Liability for this tort "'clearly does not extend to mere insults, or indignities.'" Wagoner v. Elkin City Schools' Bd. of Education, 113 N.C. App. 579, 586, 440 S.E.2d 119, 123 (quoting Daniel v. Carolina Sunrock Corp., 110 N.C. App. 376, 383, 430 S.E.2d 306, 310, rev'd in part, 335 N.C. 233, 436 S.E.2d 835 (1993)), disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 615, 447 S.E.2d 414 (1994). Moreover, a plaintiff must set forth specific incidents of conduct which "'exceed all bounds usually tolerated by decent society.'" Stanback, 297 N.C. at 196, 254 S.E.2d at 622 (quoting Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 12, at 56).
After careful examination of the record, there is nothing in the Rosenthal complaint alleging that plaintiff's conduct was "extreme and outrageous." Nor are there allegations which indicate that by its conduct plaintiff corporation intended that Mr. Rosenthal suffer severe emotional distress. Accordingly, Mr. Rosenthal's complaint fails to make out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We do find, however, from a review of the Rosenthal complaint, that there is genuine issue of fact as to whether plaintiff negligently caused Mr. Rosenthal to suffer severe emotional distress. As all evidence is to be considered "indulgently" at the summary judgment stage of proceedings, Fowler v. Valencourt, 108 N.C. App. 106, 114, 423 S.E.2d 785, 790 (1992)(citing Page v. Sloan, 281 N.C. 697, 190 S.E.2d 189 (1972)), rev'd in part on other grounds , 334 N.C. 345, 435 S.E.2d 530 (1993), with "the slightest doubt as to the facts entitling plaintiff to a trial," id. (citing Snipes v. Jackson, 69 N.C. App. 64, 316 S.E.2d 657, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 85, 321 S.E.2d 899 (1984)), plaintiff is entitled to a trial on the issue of whether Mr. Rosenthal's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress adequately presents a claim for "bodily injury " within the definition of the "Comprehensive General Liability Insurance" coverage part of defendant Fireman's Fund's policies.
Since the Rosenthal suit includes a prima facie showing for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and such is a "bodily injury" within the meaning of defendant Fireman's Fund's policies, we find that the trial court was correct in its decision that defendant Fireman's Fund provided insurance coverage for the Rosenthal suit. However, the court was in error in its Conclusion that defendant Fireman's Fund's policies provided coverage for the other
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