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KNOKE v. S.C. DEPT. OF PARKS11/4/1996
Respondent/appellant Knoke commenced this
FACTS
Jeremy died in a fire on July 5, 1991, while sleeping in a cabin at Cheraw State Park. He was staying at the park's group camp facility as a guest of Berea First Baptist Church which had leased the facility from appellant/respondent (Department). Five boys slept in a ten-by-twelve room in a cabin on four beds pushed closely together, one with a top bunk bed on it. After the boys were asleep, a fire started in the area of an electrical fan Jeremy had brought with him from home. The other boys awoke and were able to escape in a matter of seconds. Jeremy's body was found on the bed next to his own as if he had tried to escape but was unable to do so. The cause of his death was asphyxiation from smoke inhalation.
Knoke alleged Department was negligent in failing to provide a smoke detector in the cabin. After the jury rendered its verdict, Department moved to reduce the verdict to either $250,000 or $500,000 as provided in the Tort Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-120 (a) (1) and (2) (Supp. 1995). The trial judge ruled both caps in the Tort Claims Act were repealed and denied the motion. He also denied Knoke's motion for attorney's fees. Both parties appeal.
ISSUES
1. Do the caps specified in the Tort Claims Act apply?
2. Is the verdict excessive?
3. Did the trial judge improperly admit expert testimony?
4. Should attorney's fees have been awarded under § 15-77-300?
DISCUSSION
1) Tort Claims Act
In Southeastern Freight Lines v. City of Hartsville, 313 S.C. 466, 443 S.E.2d 395 (1994), a case involving joint
2) Amount of verdict
Department contends the trial judge erred in denying its motions for a new trial nisi remittitur or new trial absolute based on the excessiveness of the jury's verdict. When a defendant's request to remit the verdict is denied, this Court will reverse only if (1) the refusal to remit was controlled by an error of law, which is not the case here, or (2) a new trial absolute should have been granted. O'Neal v. Bowles, 314 S.C. 525, 431 S.E.2d 555 (1993); Gray v. Davis, 247 S.C. 536, 148 S.E.2d 682 (1966). A new trial absolute should be granted only if the verdict is so grossly excessive that it shocks the conscience of the court and clearly indicates the amount of the verdict was the result of caprice, passion, prejudice, partiality, corruption, or other improper motive. McCourt v. Abernathy, 318 S.C. 301, 457 S.E.2d 603 (1995); Rush v. Blanchard, 310 S.C. 375, 426 S.E.2d 802 (1993). The jury's determination of damages is entitled to substantial deference. McCourt, supra; Rush, supra.
This a
3) Expert testimony
Mike Schultz, Knoke's fire expert, testified that the absence of a smoke detector was contrary to State and national standards of care. In his opinion, Department had a duty to conduct an analysis of the cabin's safety. He testified the cabin was unsafe without a smoke detector because it was used by sleeping children unfamiliar with the structure and that a smoke detector would have provided a sufficient warning for Jeremy to escape.
Department first challenges the admission of this testimony on the ground Schultz should not have been qualified as an expert. Generally, defects in the amount and quality of education and experience go to the weight of an expert's testimony and not its admissibility. Lee v. Suess, 318 S.C. 283, 457 S.E.2d 344 (1995). The test for qualification is a relative one that is dependent on the particular witness's reference to the subject. Id.
Schultz testified he was a
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