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MCKISSICK v. J. F. CLECKLEY & COMPANY11/25/1996
nsequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence).
D. Cleckley's Profit
Cleckley contends the trial judge also erred by preventing Cleckley from refuting McKissick's allegations Cleckley's financial motivations contributed to its negligence.
The contract price for the paving job was admitted into evidence without objection. Counsel for McKissick argued during the trial that Cleckley was more interested in money than safety. In response, Cleckley attempted to offer evidence of its net profit on the job. The trial judge refused to allow Cleckley's employees to testify about the actual costs involved in the job. Cleckley argues evidence of its net profit was relevant in light of McKissick's efforts to show the company had financial motives for failing to take proper precautionary measures.
Because the contract was admitted without objection, we cannot now consider alleged errors or any issue concerning its admissibility. Geddings v. Geddings, 319 S.C. 213, 460 S.E.2d 376 (1995) (failure to object when evidence is offered precludes appellate review). Cleckley did present evidence the contract required the company to perform work on more than fourteen miles of road and that the work took longer than seven days. From this evidence, the jury could have inferred the entire
$475,000 contract price covered more than only seven miles of resurfacing.
Cleckley further argues the trial judge erred in refusing to allow testimony regarding costs involved in completing the work required by the contract. Cleckley's counsel posed the following question to one of Cleckley's employees: "The money that Cleckley made or was paid for the contract, what has to come out of that money?" McKissick's counsel objected to the question, stating: "Objection, Your Honor, that has nothing to do with this case." The trial court sustained the objection, and a bench conference followed. However, there was no follow-up proffer of testimony. Absent a proffer, there is nothing before us to review. Vaughn v. City of Anderson, 300 S.C. 55, 386 S.E.2d 297 (Ct. App. 1989).
In any event, even if the judge erred, this error was harmless because Cleckley has not demonstrated prejudice. State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 336 S.E.2d 150 (1985) (errors are harmless where they could not have reasonably affected the trial). In essence, Cleckley alleges the judge allowed McKissick to suggest to the jury the company made $475,000 for one week's work on a seven-mile stretch of road, while, in reality, resurfacing was only part of Cleckley's contractual duties. However, the judge allowed Cleckley to present evidence the contract required the company to work longer than seven days on more than fourteen miles of road. Clearly the jury could have inferred the contract covered more than the seven mile stretch.
E. Mims's Prior Conviction
Cleckley claims the trial judge erred in allowing McKissick to impeach Harry Mims, Cleckley's president, by cross-examining him about his prior conviction in 1982 for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. As a result of the trial judge's ruling, Mims proffered testimony but did not testify. Cleckley claims the conviction, thirteen years prior to trial, was too remote to be probative.
Cleckley proffered Mims's testimony. He basically would have testified the work Cleckley did on the Sheldon Church Road project was confined to the roadway itself and did not include the shoulder. A number of other witnesses testified in detail to this same evidence.
An appellant seeking reversal must show error and prejudice. Wayne Smith Constr. Co. v. Wolman, Dubber
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